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Privatization an d Regulat io n i n Turkis h Te lecommunicat ions : 
A Prel iminar y Assessmen t 
A B S T R A C T : 
T h e importanc e o f efficien t work ing s o f networ k industrie s an d th e market s i n whic h 
they operat e ha s lon g bee n recognize d i n th e literature . I n a  paralle l fash ion , polic y 
makers aroun d th e worl d init iate d var iou s restructurin g effort s focusin g o n thes e 
sectors. However , th e issue s o f privatizatio n an d muc h neede d subsequen t regulator y 
f ramework fac e considerabl e chal lenge s i n developin g countr ies . Bot h politica l opposi t io n 
and difficultie s encountere d i n th e proces s o f privatizatio n cause d majo r delay s i n overal l 
privatization an d restructurin g effort s o f thes e countr ies . 
Th is pape r focuse s o n th e te lecommunicat ion s secto r an d th e Tur k Te leko m case , i n 
part icular, assessin g th e prospect s fo r it s much-debate d divest i ture , evaluat in g th e 
company specif ic s and subsequen t regulator y agenda . I n doin g that , i t emphas ize s th e 
current " te leco m me l tdown " i n internationa l markets , an d compare s te lecommunicat ion s 
privatizations o f var iou s nations . Addi t ional ly , th e stud y review s majo r regulator y 
methods an d draw s o n som e recommendat ion s fo r polic y maker s i n th e ligh t o f th e U. S 
exper ience i n thi s sector . 
JEL Classi f icat ion : L 5 1 , L96, L9 8 
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1-Introduction: Cas e fo r Te lecommunicat ion s Privatizatio n an d Globa l  
Exper ience 
Historical ly, te lecommunicat ion s service s wer e considere d t o b e a  natura l monopoly . 
Th is widel y share d characterist i c o f th e industr y ca n b e trace d bac k t o economic s o f th e 
industry. Economi c theory def ine s natura l monopol y a s a  singl e fir m tha t ca n serv e th e 
entire marke t a t a  lowe r averag e cos t tha n tw o o r mor e f irms . Fo r a  natura l monopoly , 
the lon g ru n averag e cos t (LRAC ) curv e s lope s downwar d du e t o economie s o f scale . 
Thus , th e fir m i s capabl e o f achievin g th e lowes t poin t o f LRA C curv e i f th e marke t i s 
served b y a  singl e f i rm . Consider in g th e scal e an d cos t o f te lecommunicat ion s networks , 
it wa s bel ieve d tha t compet i t io n woul d dupl icat e investment , rais e costs , inflat e rate s 
and mak e service s unavai labl e t o th e public . Therefore , te lecommunicat io n service s 
were bes t t o b e provide d b y on e f i rm . However , thi s i s no t th e cas e anymore . Th e 
explosive introductio n o f ne w technologie s an d thei r appl icat ion s suc h a s digi tal , 
mobi le /personal communicat ion s system s (PCS) , broadban d t ransmiss ion , interne t an d 
e-commerce etc . an d paralle l deve lopment s i n th e theor y o f Industria l Organizat io n ha s 
dramatical ly change d th e economic s o f th e industr y an d th e tradit iona l t reatmen t o f 
te lecommunicat ions a s a  natura l monopoly . Technologica l progres s reduce d th e exten t 
of economie s o f scal e i n networ k construct io n an d uti l ization , whic h al lowe d multipl e 
players i n th e market . Th i s subsequent l y shran k th e cor e o f th e natura l monopoly . 
Therefore , dupl icat iv e investmen t argumen t i n favo r o f natura l monopol y ha s los t it s 
validity i n larg e part s o f th e sector . Onc e te lecommunicat ion s market s ar e opene d t o 
compet i t ion bot h productive  an d allocative  eff icienc y improvement s ar e achieved . I n 
other words , product io n cost s ar e lowere d an d consume r preference s ar e serve d better . 
Innovat ions suc h a s microwav e an d satellit e technologie s mad e compet i t io n possibl e i n 
service segment s suc h a s long-distanc e communicat ion . Man y develope d economie s 
capital izing o n technologica l progres s hav e bee n servin g thei r consumer s compet i t ivel y 
in th e long-distanc e te lecommunicat ion s market s fo r a lmos t tw o decade s b y separat in g 
local exchang e fro m th e long-distanc e market . 
Te lecommunicat ions industrie s ar e becomin g increasingl y capita l intensiv e an d requir e a 
substantial amoun t o f f ixe d investments . I n th e rapidl y evolvin g globa l economy , 
te lecommunicat ions operator s hav e t o kee p u p wit h th e need s o f increasingl y 
sophist icated user s wh o deman d low-cost , reliabl e an d high-spee d network s fo r 
transmitt ing da ta , vo ice , tex t an d images . Stat e o f th e ar t te lecommunicat io n 
infrastructure i s a  prerequisit e fo r economi c growth . Th i s imperat iv e put s furthe r 
pressure o n th e government s t o expan d an d upgrad e thei r exist in g network s t o attrac t 
and retai n compan ie s withi n thei r borders . 
The exper ienc e i n te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n an d compet i t ion , primari l y i n th e U. S 
and U.K. , indicate d tha t privat e capita l coul d b e use d t o develo p thi s sector . 
Recogniz ing th e potentia l fo r th e evolut io n o f a  compet i t iv e industry , government s unde r 
severe budge t constraint s turne d t o privat e participatio n fo r investment . Multi latera l 
efforts, suc h a s th e Grou p o f Basi c Te lecommunicat ion s (GBT ) initiate d b y th e Wor l d 
Trade Organizat io n (WTO) , furthe r accelerate d th e momentu m fo r refor m an d 
l iberalization i n te lecommunicat ions . 7 2 countr ies , includin g 4 2 developin g economies , 
made seriou s commi tment s fo r privatizatio n an d l iberalizatio n o f thei r te lecommunicat io n 
industries wit h soli d deadl ine s (se e Tab le 1) . 
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Table -1 : Larges t Te lecommunicat ion s Privatization s 
Company Country Date Size ($millions ) 
NTT-2 Japan 1987 39,780 
NTT-3 Japan 1988 22,800 
NTT-1 Japan 1986 18,670 
Telecom Itali a Italy 1997 14,900 
Deutsche Telecom-3 Germany 2000 13,800 
Deutsche Telecom- 1 Germany 1996 13,300 
Telstra Australia 1997 11,240 
Deutsche Telecom-2 Germany 1999 9,900 
BT-2 UK 1986 9,990 
BT-3 UK 1993 8,060 
France Telecom France 1997 7,100 
Source: Compile d from Privatizatio n Internationa l (PI ) Yearboo k 1997,1998,199 9 an d 2000 . 
While develope d countr ie s wit h th e mos t advance d te lecommunicat io n infrastructur e 
and wit h hig h te le-dens i t ies 1 wer e feel in g th e urg e t o privatiz e an d liberaliz e thei r 
te lecommunicat ions industr ies , developin g countr ie s face d toughe r chal lenges . 
Accord ing t o Internationa l Te lecommunicat io n Unio n ( ITU) , mor e tha n 7 5 % o f th e 13 2 
member countr ie s hav e onl y on e te lephon e lin e pe r te n people 2 . Mor e tha n hal f o f th e 
world populat io n live s i n countr ie s wit h les s tha n 1  te lephon e t o a  hundre d cit izens . I n 
many developin g an d emergin g markets , larg e unme t d e m a n d , lon g wait in g t imes , cal l 
traffic congest ion , poo r servic e qual i ty , out-date d technology , l imite d territoria l coverag e 
and th e absenc e o f moder n busines s service s wer e manifestat ion s o f th e failur e o f th e 
state owne d te lecommunicat ion s monopol ies . Developin g Countr y governments , lik e 
their counterpart s i n develope d economies , wer e unabl e t o kee p u p wit h th e investmen t 
requirements t o expan d an d upgrad e te lecommunicat ion s infrastructur e du e t o sever e 
budget constraints . Figure- 1 below , show s recen t t rend s o f privat e participatio n i n 
te lecommunicat ions investment s b y region . Accord in g t o Beardsle y an d Patsalos-Fo x 
(1995) 3 , th e averag e cos t o f addin g on e lin e t o th e loca l te lephon y loo p i s abou t $1000 . 
For instance , Czec h republ ic , Polan d an d Hungar y ha d t o spen d $70b n t o reac h a 
density o f 3 0 line s pe r 10 0 people , wel l belo w th e E U average 4 . 
Figure-1: Privat e Investment s i n Te lecommunicat ion s 1990-1998 : Emergin g 
Markets 
1 Teledensit y i s the numbe r o f activ e fixe d landline s pe r 10 0 peopl e i n a  region . 
2 ITU  Yearbook  1999. 
3 Scot t Beardsle y and Michae l Patsalos-Fo x (1995 ) "Gettin g Teleco m Privatizatio n Right, " The  McKinsey  Quarterly,  No:1 . 
4 Ibid. 
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Privatization i n th e te lecommunicat ion s secto r l iberate s a  massiv e amoun t o f scarc e 
public resource s tha t ca n b e diverte d t o heal th , educat io n an d socia l programs . Mor e 
signif icantly, i t ca n increas e th e eff icienc y an d result s i n bette r resourc e al locat ion . 
Since th e internationa l te lecommunicat ion s marke t plac e i s becomin g increasingl y 
compet i t ive i t wil l prov e harde r fo r a  governmen t monopol y t o sta y compet i t iv e i n th e 
absence o f necessar y incentive s provide d b y th e fre e market s an d privat e ownership . 
Under th e appropr iat e governanc e conf igurat ion , transfe r o f ownershi p i s expecte d t o 
lead t o mor e effectiv e monitor in g o f managemen t b y shareholder s an d creditors . 
Eff iciency improvement s an d lowe r product io n cost s wil l increas e marke t valu e o f th e 
shareholders ' investment . Sinc e th e marke t valu e o f manager s i s likel y t o depen d o n 
the valu e o f th e fir m a s reflecte d i n it s shar e price , maintainin g th e valu e o f th e f irm' s 
shares b y manager s wil l minimiz e th e cos t o f capita l t o th e f i rm . A lso , privat e f i rm s ca n 
tie manageria l compensat io n t o corporat e performanc e throug h bonuse s an d stoc k 
opt ions 5 . Anothe r signif ican t implicatio n o f privatizatio n an d th e accompany in g 
l iberalization i n te lecommunicat ion s market s i s improvement s i n al locativ e eff iciency . 
Under privat e ownersh ip , cross-subsid ie s betwee n differen t rat e c lasse s wil l ceas e t o 
exist an d realisti c rat e settin g wil l sen d correc t signal s to marke t fo r resourc e a l locat ion. 6 
However , privatizatio n o f a  te lecommunicat ion s monopol y wil l resul t i n eff icienc y gain s 
only i f th e subsequen t regulator y envi ronmen t an d marke t structur e al lo w fai r 
compet i t ion. Th e regulator' s a i m mus t b e t o creat e suc h condit ion s an d protec t 
consumers. T h e ult imat e targe t i n thi s proces s i s t o offe r mor e choic e an d lowe r 
customer bills . 
In certai n industrie s market s canno t b e relie d o n fo r sel f-correct ion . Mos t networ k 
industries ar e suc h a n example , a t leas t fo r now . Marke t imperfect ion s (o r marke t 
fai lures) nee d t o b e deal t wit h a  reasonabl e intervention . Tha t interventio n mus t b e i n 
the for m o f customize d regulat ion . Th e specif i c institutiona l an d lega l env i ronmen t o f a 
country mus t b e take n int o accoun t whe n developin g appropr iat e regulator y policies . 
Final ly, privatizatio n i n te lecommunicat ion s ca n lea d a  privatizatio n progra m an d hel p 
deve lopment o f th e stoc k market . Becaus e o f it s s ize , te lecommunicat io n privatization s 
have a  grea t potentia l fo r raisin g substantia l capita l (se e Tab le-2) . Bein g a n 
indispensable networ k industr y fo r th e informatio n ag e i t no t onl y attract s a  larg e 
number o f domest i c investors , bu t i t als o attract s internationa l capi tal . 
5 See Ioanni s Kesside s (1998 ) "  Privatisin g and Regulatin g Telecommunications," in Ir a Lieberma n and Christopher 
Kirknessed eds. , Privatisation  and  Emerging  Markets,  Th e World Ban k for a  discussion . 
6 One exception to thi s rul e i s the provisio n o f universa l service where regulate d entit y i s obligated t o serv e remote hig h 
cost areas . 
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Table-2 : Larges t Te lecommunicat ion s Publi c Offering s i n Emergin g Market s 
1990-1999 
Company Country Value (m$) Compan y Country Value (m$ ) 
China Unico m China $4,920 PT Telekomunikas i Indonesia $1,590 
China China $3,933 O T E Greece $1,280 
Singapore Teleco m Singapore $3,826 Telefonica Per u Peru $1,240 
Korea Teleco m Korea $2,486 Telecom Argentin a Argentina $1,227 
Telmex 1 Mexico $2,170 Matav Hungary $1,200 
Portugal Teleco m 3 Portugal $2,050 O T E Greece $1,083 
Portugal Teleco m 4 Portugal $1,700 Indosat Indonesia $1,060 
Chungwa Teleco m Taiwan $1,600 C A N T V Venezuela $1,026 
Source : PI 
Perotti an d va n Oi je n (1999 ) note d tha t privatizatio n sale s i n networ k industrie s an d 
public infrastructures , whic h ar e tradit ionall y inaccessibl e t o privat e an d internationa l 
investment, ma y signa l a  chang e i n th e investmen t cl imat e i n th e countr y an d attrac t 
foreign direc t investment . 7 Th e involvemen t o f mor e sophist icate d foreig n investor s wit h 
long-term orientat io n contr ibut e t o a  bette r pric e fo r th e s tock. 8 However , th e long-ter m 
potential o f th e sal e i s als o vitall y dependen t o n bringin g domest i c investor s t o th e 
market. T h e siz e o f th e privatizatio n offerin g wil l deepe n an d broade n th e domest i c 
stock market . Du e t o it s siz e an d earning s potent ia l , te lecommunicat io n privatization s 
can diffus e asse t ownershi p i n a n emerg in g economy . T h e likel y succes s o f suc h a  sal e 
has a  potentia l o f creatin g a  snowbal l effec t i n term s o f attractin g mor e domest i c an d 
international investor s fo r futur e privatizatio n initiatives . 
Between 199 0 an d 1998 , mor e tha n 9 0 developin g economie s opene d thei r 
te lecommunicat ions sector s t o pr ivat izat ion 9 . Forty-tw o countr ie s mad e commi tment s t o 
reform th e secto r i n th e contex t o f WTO ' s Basi c Te lecommunicat ions Agreemen t signe d 
in Februar y 1997 . Thes e countr ie s eithe r transferre d th e operat in g an d construct io n ris k 
to th e privat e secto r o r ar e prepare d t o d o s o i n th e nea r future . T h e Worl d Bank' s 
Private Participatio n i n Infrastructur e databas e report s $214b n o f investmen t 
commi tments betwee n 1990-1998 1 0 . Two- th i rd s o f thi s amoun t ha s bee n investe d i n 
expanding an d moderniz in g networks . Th e mos t dramat i c increas e i n privat e 
participation ha s bee n observe d i n ne w serv ices , suc h a s mobi l e communicat ion . B y th e 
end o f 1998 , 31 1 privat e mobi l e operator s offere d service s o n a  stand-alon e basi s o r 
along wit h basi c service s i n 9 4 developin g economies . Mos t o f thes e countr ie s 
introduced som e typ e o f compet i t io n i n thes e ne w services . Whi l e twenty-eigh t countr ie s 
had betwee n thre e an d si x operators , thirty-eigh t ha d duopol ies . 
7 Enric o C. Perott i an d Piete r van Oijen , (1999) "Privatization , Political Risk and Stock Market Developmen t in emergin g 
economies," Mimeo . Perott i an d van Oijen also cites F . Sader (1993) , "Privatization and Foreig n Investment i n th e 
Developing World 1988-92,""Worl d Bank Policy Researc h Working Paper , Washington D.C . for thi s agument . 
8 Phumcha i Kambhato (1998), "The Flagshi p Role o f Telecom Privatizations, " in Ir a Lieberma n and Christopher Kirkness, 
eds., Privatisation  and  Emerging  Markets,  Th e World Bank , p. 92 . 
9 Ad a Karina Izaguirre (1999) , "Private Participation in Telecommunications: Recen t T rends ," Public Policy  for  the  Private 
Sector, Not e No : 204 , The World Bank . 
1 0 Ibid . 
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Table -3 : Majo r Emergin g Marke t Te lecommunicat ion s Privatizatio n 
Country Date Government Stak e Long Distanc e Local 
Competition Competition 
Argentina 1991 No Yes/Duopoly Yes/Duopoly 
Brazil 1998 No Yes/Duopoly Yes/Duopoly 
Mexico 1991 No No No 
Peru 1996 No No No 
Venezuela 1991 No No No 
Chile 1989 No Yes/Free Entr y Yes/Free Entr y 
Indonesia 1994 Yes No No 
Malaysia 1992 Yes No No 
Korea 1993 Yes No No 
Taiwan 2000 Yes No No 
Greece 1996 Yes Yes Yes 
Portugal 1995 Yes Yes Yes 
Cz. Republic 1994 No No No 
Hungary 1993 No No No 
Poland 2000 Yes No No 
Source: P I various issues , IT U Yearbook various issues . 
However , i n th e mor e tradit iona l segment s lik e long-distanc e an d loca l service s 
compet i t ion starte d t o emerg e ver y slowl y (se e Tab le-3) . Ou t o f forty-tw o developin g 
countr ies wit h privat e involvemen t i n th e sector , onl y twelv e al lowe d som e typ e o f 
compet i t ion i n th e lon g distanc e segmen t o f th e market . I n othe r countr ie s incumben t 
operators hol d exclusiv e l icenses . I n fifty-fiv e ou t o f 9 0 developin g countr ies , privat e 
operators ar e involve d i n loca l services . However , i n fort y countr ie s eithe r monopol y 
rights awarde d t o privatize d incumbent s o r privat e investment s suc h a s bui ld-operate -
transfer (BOT ) project s wer e use d t o complemen t th e stat e owne d incumbents ' 
infrastructure. 
Privatization an d l iberalizatio n i n developin g economie s i s expecte d t o gai n furthe r pac e 
to mee t th e W T O - G B T agreemen t deadl in e o f 2005 . A  breakdow n o f activit ie s reveal s 
that Lati n Amer ic a i s th e leadin g regio n i n te lecommunicat ion s reform . Mos t Lati n 
Amer ican countr ie s starte d t o privatiz e an d l iberaliz e te lecommunicat ion s sector s dur in g 
the 1990s . Whi l e Eas t A s i a , Easter n Europ e an d Centra l Asi a la g behin d Lati n Amer i ca , 
private investment s ar e stil l signif icant . 
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2- Te lecommunicat ion s Privatizatio n i n Turke y 
2.1. A n Overv ie w o f Privatizatio n Trend s i n Turke y 
Al though a n earl y reformer , Turke y ha s ha d a  disappoint in g per formanc e i n 
privatization. T h e 198 6 Privatizatio n Maste r Pla n develope d b y Morga n Guarant y Trus t 
laid ou t th e object ive s o f th e progra m a s t o increas e industria l eff icienc y an d growt h i n 
the economy , t o develo p capita l markets , t o reduc e f inancia l suppor t fo r th e stat e 
economic enterpr ise s b y th e Treasury , an d t o facil itat e a  wide r distr ibutio n o f shar e 
ownersh ip . 1 1 However , a  combinat io n o f factor s includin g macroeconomi c disequi l ibr iu m 
in th e Turk is h economy , politica l instabilit y an d th e absenc e o f a  lega l f ramewor k fo r 
privatization le d t o a  polic y incoherence , tha t character ize d th e pos t 198 6 per iod . I n 
addit ion t o th e lac k o f enabl in g condit ion s o f macroeconomi c stabil i ty , politica l 
commi tment an d appropr iat e lega l f ramework , th e inabilit y o f government s t o gathe r 
public suppor t an d addres s concern s o f specia l interes t group s hav e dramatical l y s lowe d 
down th e pac e o f privatization . Betwee n 198 6 an d 1998 , onl y $4.6b n o f a n est imate d 
$70bn wort h o f stat e owne d asset s were d ivested . 
Despite thi s gri m pictur e an d poo r imag e o f Turk is h privatizatio n i n th e las t tw o decades , 
a numbe r o f recen t deve lopment s appeare d promis ing : 
• Fol lowin g man y amendment s i n th e law s governin g privatizatio n o f stat e owne d 
enterpr ises, an d a  mind-boggl in g numbe r o f decre e law s tha t wer e frequentl y 
invalidated b y th e Consti tut iona l Cour t , th e firs t s tand-alon e Privatizatio n La w wa s 
ratified b y par l iamen t i n Novembe r 1994 . A t last , Privatizatio n La w too k it s fina l 
form i n Apri l 1997 , afte r a  roun d o f revisions . A  landmar k legislatio n al lowin g 
international arbitratio n i n d ispute s ove r contract s involvin g provisio n o f publi c 
services wa s passe d i n Augus t 1999 . Th i s legislatio n compl imente d th e lega l 
f ramework an d opene d th e doo r fo r act iv e foreig n participatio n particularl y i n 
infrastructure an d utilit y privatizations . 
• Stan d B y Agreemen t wit h IM F i n Decembe r 199 9 an d th e ensuin g stabil izatio n 
program t o establ is h macroeconomi c stabil i ty , place d a  particula r emphas i s o n 
privatization. Th e progra m include d a  ver y ambi t iou s privatizatio n schedul e tha t 
remained o n targe t fo r a  whi le . Divestment s i n th e firs t hal f o f 200 0 a lmos t 
exceeded privatizatio n revenue s o f th e pas t tw o decade s an d wer e expecte d t o 
reach $ 5 b n b y th e en d o f 2000 . 
• A n unusua l coalit io n governmen t o f divers e politica l aspirat ion s ha d bee n signalin g 
serious commi tmen t t o th e stabil izatio n progra m an d t o privatizatio n a s a  mai n 
component o f th e program . 
With th e abov e factor s comb ined , Turke y finall y seeme d t o com e clos e t o th e thre e 
enabl ing condit ion s fo r a  successfu l privatizatio n program : a  convincin g pat h toward s 
macroeconomic stabil i ty , politica l commi tmen t b y th e governmen t an d a  soun d lega l 
1 1 Ceva t Karata s (1994) , "Ha s Privatisation Improve d Profitabilit y an d Performanc e o f th e Publi c Enterprise s i n Turkey?" i n 
Paul Coo k and Coli n Kirkpatric k eds. , Privatisation  Policy  and  Performance:  International  Perspectives,  Prentic e Hall . 
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f ramework buil t o n th e culminat in g exper ienc e o f pas t controversies . I n addit io n t o 
these macr o factors , Turke y ha d manage d t o buil d a  wel l -posi t ione d implementat io n 
body (Privatizatio n Administrat ion ) wit h substantia l exper ienc e an d considerabl e 
technical competenc e ove r th e las t decade . 
A l though i t wa s cont ingen t o n th e successfu l implementat io n o f th e stabil izatio n 
program an d politica l stabil i ty , th e Turk is h privatizatio n recor d bega n givin g signal s t o 
break awa y fro m th e stalemat e o f th e pas t toward s th e en d o f 1999 . Th e firs t 
encouraging sign s emerge d i n th e thir d quarte r o f 199 9 afte r eigh t month s o f inertia . 
The successfu l auct ionin g o f P O A S , th e country ' s bigges t petroleu m retailer , le d t o th e 
block sal e o f 5 1 % o f th e share s t o a  loca l consor t ium . Th i s wa s fol lowe d b y th e initia l 
public offerin g o f 3 1 % o f T U P R A S (petrolue m refinery ) share s i n Apri l 2000 , whic h 
attracted $265 m o f foreig n institutiona l investment . Turk is h Air l ine s wa s anothe r 
company include d i n th e ambi t iou s 200 0 program , wit h a  projecte d bloc k sal e o f mor e 
than 5 1 % . Th e 200 0 Privatizatio n Progra m targete d $5. 3 b n i n implementat io n wit h 
about $3.1b n cas h f low s withi n th e yea r th e 200 0 excludin g tw o G S M l i censes . 1 2 I f th e 
implementat ion targe t wer e reache d a t th e en d o f th e year , yea r 200 0 implementat ion s 
alone woul d hav e exceede d th e tota l privatizatio n revenue s generate d betwee n 198 6 
and 1998 . Te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n wa s centra l t o maintainin g thi s ne w 
momentum an d coul d hav e furthe r energize d th e privatizatio n program . I t woul d als o 
be a n importan t turnin g poin t sinc e i t woul d const i tut e th e firs t signif ican t natura l 
monopoly privatizatio n i n th e Turk is h economi c histor y wit h a  demand in g institutiona l 
infrastructure. 
First sign s o f refor m fat igu e wer e fel t whe n d isagreement s o n th e Turk is h Air l ine s an d 
Turk Te leko m privatizatio n surface d i n th e coali t io n governmen t i n mi d 2000 . B y th e 
t ime interna l di f ference s irone d ou t an d th e lega l hurdle s addressed , 
Te lecommunicat ions mel tdow n ha d alread y starte d i n th e internationa l markets . Th i s 
had turne d th e t id e agains t a  successfu l privatization . Nex t , arr ive d th e Novembe r min i 
cr is is, whic h wa s fol lowe d b y a  majo r f inancia l turmoi l i n February . T h e fol lowin g 
section focuse s on th e pat h t o Februar y 2001 . 
2.2. Pat h t o Te lecommunicat ion s Privatizatio n an d Secto r Refor m 
T h e privatizatio n o f Tur k Te leko m wa s initiate d i n 1994 , onl y month s afte r th e 
September 199 3 commun iqu e establ ishin g Tur k Te leko m a s a  separat e entit y f ro m PTT . 
In Ma y 1995 , la w 410 7 author ize d th e sal e of 4 9 % o f th e compan y an d opene d th e doo r 
for te lecommunicat ion s l icens e agreements . However , sinc e then , privatizatio n o f 
te lecommunicat ion service s ha s bee n subjec t t o politica l an d lega l squabbl ing . I n 
February 1996 , the Consti tut iona l Cour t overturne d critica l part s o f th e law . Afte r severa l 
rounds o f cancel lat ions , th e La w 416 1 wa s enacted . Subsequent ly , th e Consti tut iona l 
Court rejecte d a n effor t le d b y 16 1 par l iamentar ian s t o rul e th e privatizatio n o f Tur k 
Te lekom il legal . 
1 2 Emergin g Turkey 2000 , p . 206 . 
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T h e te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n la w wa s partl y amende d i n mi d 199 6 t o strengthe n 
the lega l basi s fo r valuat io n an d biddin g me thods . 1 3 I n th e contex t o f La w 4 1 6 1 , Tur k 
Te lekom privatizatio n wa s linke d t o secto r refor m an d compan y va luat ion , whic h woul d 
be fol lowe d b y actua l execut io n o f th e sal e o f th e company . A  Va lu e Assessmen t 
Commi t tee (VAC ) wa s forme d t o perfor m th e valuat io n exerc ise s and a  consort iu m le d 
by Go ldma n Sach s wa s appointe d t o provid e advisor y services . Th e V A C commit tee an d 
its advisor s se t genera l guidel ine s fo r secto r refor m an d a  draf t amendin g la w wa s 
prepared t o restructur e th e te lecommunicat ion s secto r an d Tur k Te lekom . T h e draf t 
amending te lecommunicat ion s la w envis ione d th e fo l lowing : 
• Establ ishin g an independen t te lecommunicat ion s regulato r 
• Bringin g ful l l iberalizatio n fo r th e valu e adde d service s 
• Givin g commerc ia l independenc e t o Tur k Te leko m (i .e. , corporat izat ion ) t o minimiz e 
government interventio n 
• Specifyin g th e exclusivit y perio d an d servic e scop e fo r Tur k Te leko m unde r a 
concession agreemen t 
• Address in g changes i n th e statu s o f Tur k Te leko m employee s 
V A C an d it s advisor s als o propose d a  privatizatio n strategy , whic h wa s late r approve d b y 
the Counci l o f Minister s i n Februar y 1998 . T h e sal e strateg y adopte d b y th e Counci l 
suggested a  bloc k sal e o f 2 0 % , t o a  strategi c partne r fol lowe d b y a  1 9 % initia l publi c 
offering o f Tur k Te leko m shares . Th e bloc k sal e t o a  strategi c investo r o r consort i a 
requires part icipatio n o f a n internationa l te lecommunicat ion s operato r tha t wil l brin g 
expert ise an d know-ho w an d accelerat e th e commercial izat io n o f Tur k Te lekom . 
Specif ics o f th e managemen t right s i n th e scop e o f th e bloc k sal e wer e lef t t o 
negotiat ions i n th e auct io n p rocess 1 4 . 
T h e ne w Te lecommunicat ion s La w wa s passe d o n Januar y 2 9 t h , 2000 . Accord in g t o thi s 
version o f th e law , Tur k Te leko m woul d retai n monopol y right s o n voic e t ransmissio n 
and infrastructur e unti l Decembe r 3 1 s t , 2003 . Tur k Te leko m woul d b e th e pr imar y 
provider o f infrastructur e t o othe r operator s an d individua l owner s o f te lecommunicat io n 
facil it ies unti l it s monopol y right s wer e terminated . Othe r entit ie s woul d b e al lowe d t o 
provide te lecommunicat ion s service s unde r concessio n agreements wit h th e Ministr y o f 
Transportat ion. Final ly , loca l operator s wer e permitte d t o negotiat e contract s wit h 
international companie s fo r a  rang e o f activit ie s includin g internationa l 
te lecommunicat ions service s within th e limit s o f relevan t legislat ion . 
Within th e scop e o f La w No . 4 1 6 1 , a  Tende r Commi t te e (TC ) wa s forme d t o undertak e 
the execut io n o f th e Tur k Te leko m sale . O n behal f o f th e T C , th e Privatizatio n 
Administrat ion invite d bid s fo r a  2 0 % bloc k sal e a s o f Jun e 1 3 t h . Th e closin g dat e fo r 
bids wa s Septembe r 1 5 t h , a t whic h t im e th e tw o highes t bidder s woul d compet e i n a n 
auct ion t o determin e th e winner . However , a  lac k o f interes t du e t o obscur e 
management r ights , le d t o th e postponemen t o f th e auct ion . Th e percentag e o f 
1 3 Meri h Celasu n and Ismai l Arslan , (2000), "Stat e Owned Enterprise s in Turkey: Polic y Performance and Refor m 
Experience, 1985-1995 , in Meri h Celasun ed., State owned  Enterprises  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa:  Privatization, 
Performance and  Reform. 
1 4 Thi s provisio n turned ou t t o b e an importan t impedimen t t o th e privatizatio n o f Turk Telekom. I t stirre d muc h debat e 
among th e coalitio n partner s an d delaye d the privatizatio n o f th e company . 
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ownership stak e t o b e offere d t o th e strategi c partner(s ) an d th e controversia l 
management right s wer e reconsidere d b y th e government . Subsequent ly , a  decre e 
signed b y th e presiden t author ize d th e bloc k sal e o f 3 3 . 5 % o f th e compan y i n Decembe r 
2000. T h e decre e als o include d a n articl e prescribin g a  publi c offerin g o f 0 . 5 % o f th e 
Turk Te leko m shares . Th e tende r fo r 3 3 . 5 % o f Tur k Te leko m wa s announce d o n 
December 14 t h , an d bidder s wer e invite d t o registe r an d sig n confidential i t y agreement . 
Data roo m fo r th e prospect iv e bidder s wer e opene d o n Februar y 1 2 t h , 200 1 an d th e 
tender commit te e wa s expecte d t o accep t offer s unti l Ma y 1 4 t h , 2001 . However , th e 
f inancial cr isis , t r iggere d b y a  confrontat io n betwee n Pr im e Ministe r an d th e Presiden t 
led t o a  col laps e o f th e Decembe r 199 9 Stand-b y agreemen t wit h th e IM F an d th e 
tender wa s practicall y cancel led . Th e realizatio n tha t th e uncertaint y abou t th e 
management right s woul d hinde r a  successfu l privatizatio n i n a  depresse d globa l 
te lecom market , le d t o a  ne w proposa l t o privatiz e 5 1 % o f th e company . 
Another amendmen t i n th e Te leco m La w wa s passe d on Ma y 1 4 t h , 2001 , primari l y du e t o 
an implici t condit ional i t y impose d b y th e IMF , whic h l inke d Tur k Te leko m privatizatio n 
and th e IM F le d f inancia l bail-out . T h e ne w la w al low s privatizatio n o f th e 1 0 0 % o f Tur k 
Te lekom, an d al locate s a  golde n shar e t o th e governmen t wit h vet o powe r i n majo r 
strategic decis ions . Th e la w limit s foreig n ownershi p a t 4 5 % , an d waive s th e 
requirement o f part icipatio n o f a  mult inationa l operato r i n th e biddin g consort ia . I t als o 
links th e monopol y powe r t o th e publi c ownersh ip , an d st ipulate s tha t monopol y statu s 
be abol ishe d befor e Decembe r 31 ,2003 , i f b y the n Tur k Te leko m i s majori t y owne d b y 
private entit ies . A  notabl e an d ver y signif ican t chang e i n th e la w i s th e transfe r o f th e 
authori ty t o sig n concessio n agreement s wit h privat e operator s an d servic e providers , 
f rom th e Ministr y o f Transportat io n t o th e Te leco m Regulator . Th e ne w la w als o 
included amendment s tha t a ime d t o insulat e th e compan y fro m politica l interferenc e an d 
the implementat io n o f professiona l managemen t practices . A l thoug h th e amendmen t o f 
the la w create s grea t dea l o f flexibilit y fo r th e governmen t t o pursu e it s privatizatio n 
strategy, lega l expert s maintai n tha t withou t a n amendmen t i n th e const i tut ion , 
privatization o f mor e tha n 5 1 % o f Tur k Te leko m i s likel y t o fac e lega l chal lenges . As o f 
May 17th , 2 0 0 1 , the governmen t di d no t addres s a  consti tut iona l change . I f i t become s 
an issue , i t i s no t clea r whethe r thi s lega l hurdl e ca n b e overcom e i n a  starkl y spli t 
parl iament ,  wher e two-thi rd s majori t y i s neede d fo r consti tut iona l amendments . 
A furthe r assessmen t o f th e privatizatio n strateg y an d th e regulator y f ramewor k 
envis ioned i n th e la w 416 1 wil l b e develope d i n sect ion s 4  an d 5  fol lowin g highl ight s o f 
the Tur k Te leko m i n sect io n 3 . 
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3- A n Overv ie w o f Turkis h Te lecommunicat ion s Secto r 
3.1. Infrastructur e Developmen t 
T h e PT T wa s establ ishe d i n 1924 , unde r La w No . 406 , an d i t receive d a  monopol y ove r 
te lecommunicat ions, post , an d te legraph . However , developmen t o f th e secto r remaine d 
slow unti l 1983-1984 , whe n th e PT T wa s incorporate d a s a  Stat e Economi c Enterpris e 
within th e Ministr y o f Transportat io n an d sectora l polic y bega n t o emphas iz e networ k 
expansion an d modernizat ion . T h e dynami c expansio n o f th e 1980 s wa s invigorate d 
during 1994-199 6 b y th e enactmen t o f a  numbe r o f law s tha t amende d La w No . 406 . 
Law No . 400 0 separate d te lecommunicat io n an d posta l service s an d create d th e 
company Turk  Telekomunikasyon  A . .  I n combinat io n wit h subsequen t Law s -  410 7 an d 
4161 -  La w No . 400 0 lai d th e lega l foundat io n fo r th e privatizatio n o f 4 9 % o f Tur k 
T e l e k o m 1 5 . Provisio n wa s als o mad e fo r th e l icensin g o f privat e companie s t o provid e 
va lue-added services . 
T h e result s o f th e change s sinc e 198 3 hav e bee n twofold : (1 ) a  rapidl y growin g 
te lecommunicat ions sector , an d (2 ) th e evolut io n o f a  sectora l structur e tha t i s 
appropr iate fo r privat izat ion . 
In 1983 , wirel in e teledensi t y stoo d a t 3 . 5 % . Wait in g list s exceede d bot h th e exist in g 
number o f subscr iber s an d th e capaci t y o f th e network . A t tha t t ime , th e countr y 
embarked o n a  ten-yea r $ 6 b n investmen t progra m vi a a n increas e i n it s investment s o f 
its f ixe d lin e te lecommunicat ion s networ k b y 1 7 % pe r a n n u m , resultin g i n a  rapi d 
transit ion t o digita l exchange s an d t ransmiss ion , a s wel l a s a  seven-fol d increas e i n 
number o f subscr ibers . A s a  resul t o f thi s investmen t p rogram , Turkey ' s te ledensi t y ha s 
been brough t int o lin e wit h it s leve l o f G D P per capit a a s show n i n Figure-2 . 
Figure-2: Teledensi t y v s G D P pe r Capi ta-199 8 
Following a  perio d o f signif ican t investments , Turke y ha s dramatical l y expande d th e 
network an d modernize d th e infrastructure . Th e char t belo w il lustrate s th e leve l o f 
digital ization o f th e Turk is h networ k relativ e t o othe r operator s base d o n 199 8 data . 
1 5 Thi s la w i s expected to b e amende d t o allo w fo r th e divestmen t o f 5 1 % of th e company . 
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Current level s o f exchang e an d t ransmissio n digital izatio n ar e a t 8 4 % an d 9 6 % 
respectively. 
Figure-3: Digitalizatio n Rat e i n Turkis h Networ k 
Source: IT U 199 9 Yearbook . 
In spit e o f th e modernize d networ k an d th e increase d leve l o f penetrat ion , spendin g o n 
te lecommunicat ions wa s est imate d t o b e onl y 1.7 % o f G D P i n 1998 , highlightin g th e 
potential fo r marke t growth . Figure- 4 compare s Turke y wit h othe r market s base d o n 
1998 data . 
Figure-4: Te lecommunicat ion s spendin g a s a  percentag e o f G D P 
Source: IT U 199 9 Yearboo k and Worl d Bank . 
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3.2 Te lecommunicat ion s Services : P S T N , Busines s Networ k Serv ices , 
Mobi le Communica t ions , Cabl e an d Satellit e 
3.2.1. Publi c Switc h Te lecommunicat ion s Networ k 
Turk Te leko m i s th e sol e provide r o f publi c switche d voic e te lephon y an d fixe d 
te lecommunicat ions network s i n Turkey . Revenue s fro m PST N service s reache d t o 
$3,074 m  a t th e en d o f 199 9 an d accounte d fo r 8 7 % o f Tur k Te lekom' s tota l revenues . 
Network deve lopmen t investment s initiate d i n 198 3 create d th e fourteent h larges t PST N 
network i n th e wor ld . Teledensi t y ha s grow n b y approximatel y 1 0 . 6 % pe r yea r durin g 
1990-1996, an d averag e teledensi t y ha d reache d 2 8 % i n Decembe r 1999 . 
Table-4: Deve lopmen t o f Installe d Capaci ty , 1995-199 9 
ITEM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
PSTN capacit y ( # lines ) 14,522,391 15,812,13 8 17,584,26 5 18,558,70 7 19,679,00 9 
Capacity adde d - 1,289,747 1,772,127 974,442 1,120,302 
Installed capacit y provide d o n 149,950 401,970 601,845 824,076 1,315,424 
a revenue-paybac k basis 
Digital acces s line s (% ) 77% 78% 82% 8 3 % 84% 
Analogue acces s line s (% ) 23% 22% 18% 17% 16% 
Manual acces s line s (% ) 0.20% - - - -
Lines i n urba n area s (% ) 74% 75% 76% 76% 77% 
Lines i n rura l area s (% ) 26% 25% 24% 24% 23% 
Business Lines 24% 24% 24% 25% 24% 
Residential Lines 74% 74% 74% 74% 75% 
Discounted Line s 1.86% 1.61% 1.53% 0.62% 0.60% 
Payphone Line s 0.44% 0.44% 0.45% 0.47% 0.44% 
Free Line s 0.35% 0.30% 0.29% 0.28% 0.28% 
A tota l o f 1,120,30 2 line s o f ne w capacit y wer e installe d dur in g 1999 , includin g 491,34 8 
lines se t u p o n a  revenue-paybac k basis . Projecte d installatio n o f ne w line s envisage d i n 
the investmen t program s fo r 200 0 an d 200 1 ar e expecte d t o increas e th e penetrat io n 
rate t o 2 9 . 7 % an d 3 0 . 7 % , respectively . 
A s o f Decembe r 1999 , th e tota l numbe r o f acces s line s installe d i n th e countr y ha d 
reached 19. 7 mil l ion . Th e networ k cont inue s t o gro w i n rura l areas . Th e numbe r o f 
rural vi l lage s an d sett lement s havin g acces s t o automat i c te lephon e service s ha s 
increased dramatical l y sinc e 199 4 t o reac h 45,17 2 b y th e en d o f 1999 . However , i n spit e 
of th e effort s t o reduc e geographi c imbalance s i n infrastructure , 3 5 . 8 % o f th e al l l ine s 
are stil l concentrate d i n thre e mai n cit ie s wit h highes t teledensit ies . 
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Tradit ional ly, d iscounte d an d fre e line s hav e bee n give n t o part icula r type s o f cus tomers , 
such a s governmen t agenc ies , Tur k Te leko m employees , V IPs , an d journal ists . T h e 
number o f d iscounte d an d fre e line s ha s bee n relativel y smal l a t aroun d 0 . 6 % o f th e 
total numbe r o f subscr ibe r l ines , an d thi s represent s a  signif ican t decl in e fro m th e leve l 
in 199 7 whe n th e percentag e wa s aroun d 1.6% . Afte r th e enactmen t o f th e Amend in g 
Law, Tur k Te leko m cease d t o provid e an y fre e busines s o r residentia l fre e lines . 
Turkey i s no t a n except io n t o lon g wait in g list s exper ience d prio r t o te lecommunicat ion s 
privatization i n emerg in g markets . Th e fol lowin g tabl e clearl y reveal s unevennes s i n 
access networ k roll-out , an d th e existenc e o f signif ican t exces s deman d fo r f ixe d lin e 
services. 
Table -5 : Th e Wait in g Lis t b y Regio n (Numbe r o f Requests ) 
City/Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Istanbul 160,952 171,680 157,113 179,677 191,391 
Ankara 28,144 21,013 15,081 24,425 20,488 
Izmir 49,133 36,208 26,766 30,409 24,238 
Marmara (excludin g Istanbul ) 133.716 143.625 104.276 69,692 88,134 
Aegean (excludin g Izmir ) 90,266 97,651 64,537 85,935 70,053 
Mediterranean 89.219 91.386 68.258 65,862 80,452 
Black Sea 102,197 95,155 69,591 83,241 74,520 
Central-Anatolia (excludin g 42.128 37.869 23.97 21,113 22,723 
Ankara) 
East Anatoli a 28,275 25,780 22,236 27,512 35,705 
South East Anatoli a 25.572 24.869 26.005 28,382 34,427 
Totals 749,602 745,236 577,833 616,248 642,131 
3.2.2. Us e o f Revenu e Paybac k Agreement s wit h Suppl ier s fo r Networ k 
Expansion 
In orde r t o facil itat e th e realizatio n o f th e roll-ou t object ives , Tur k Te leko m ha s entere d 
into revenue-paybac k agreement s wit h Turk is h te lephon e equipmen t manufacturer s (fo r 
swi tches, t ransmissio n equipmen t an d cabl ing ) sinc e 1995 . Thes e agreement s hav e 
been a  practica l mean s o f f inancin g equipmen t purchases , g ive n th e constraint s o n 
capital expendi ture s impose d b y th e Treasury . Th e revenue-paybac k provision s an d th e 
durat ion o f thes e agreement s var y sinc e the y ar e negotiate d betwee n th e compan y an d 
the manufacturer s part icipatin g i n th e tender . Unde r typica l revenue-paybac k 
agreements o f thi s type , suppl ier s receiv e betwee n 1 5 % an d 2 5 % o f lin e connect io n 
fees an d th e puls e valu e o f usage . Revenue-paybac k period s var y wit h th e scop e o f th e 
investment carrie d ou t b y th e manufactur in g partne r (typicall y 8  month s fo r exchange s 
only, 1 2 t o 1 8 month s fo r exchange s an d externa l plant , an d 1 8 t o 2 4 month s fo r 
exchanges , externa l plant , an d cus tome r premise s installation) . Tur k Te leko m col lect s 
revenues procure d unde r revenue-paybac k agreements , an d payment s ar e subsequent l y 
made t o th e supplier . 
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3.2.3. PST N Revenue s 
Turk Te leko m ha s historicall y no t charge d a  lin e renta l fee . Th e compan y ha s bee n 
using a  " b u n d l e d " tarif f schem e sinc e 1998 . Charge s are paid i n advanc e monthly , an d 
include 10 0 fre e pulse s fo r calls . Unuse d pulse s a t th e en d o f th e mont h ca n b e 
transferred unti l th e end of the year, bu t unuse d pulse s expir e a t the end of year . W e 
should not e tha t unti l recentl y th e compan y lacke d f reedo m t o implemen t alternativ e 
tariff scheme s an d charg e lin e rentals . Th i s ha s change d wit h th e ratif icatio n o f th e 
Amend ing L a w , which ha s introduce d addit iona l f reedo m fo r Tur k Te leko m t o charg e 
line rental s an d similar renta l payments . 
Prepayment charge s amounte d t o $  542 m i n 1999 , representin g 1 7 . 6 % of PST N 
revenues o r 1 5 . 3 % o f gross te lecommunicat ion s revenue . 
Table-6 : Puls e Durat io n an d Average Price s pe r Minute (a s of 1 0 / 0 9 / 9 9 ) 
Local /  Intra-Cit y U p to 10 0 Ove r 100k m T o T o Interne t 90 0 Line 
Metropolitan k m GSM M NM T 
Peak 
Seconds pe r pulse 9 0 2 4 1 5 1 2 6  1 2 36 0 0. 8 - 2. 4 
Tariff (c/min ) 2.1 3 8.0 1 12.8 2 16.0 2 32.0 5 16.0 2 0.5 3 24 0 to 800 
Off-peak 
Seconds pe r pulse 12 8 to 15 0 3 4 to 40 2 1 to 25 1 7 to 20 6  1 7 to 20 51 4 to 600 0. 8 to 2.4 
Tariff (c/min ) 1.4 9 to 1.2 7 5. 6 to 4.8 8.9 7 t o 7.69 11.2 1 t o 9.61 32.0 5 11.2 1 t o 9.61 0.3 7 t o 0.31 24 0 to 800 
Figures base d on a pulse pric e o f TL 15,00 0 a s of 20 October 1999 , includin g VA T (15% ) . Conversio n to US $ a t an 
exchange rat e o f US$1 = TL 468,000, as of 20 October 1999 . 
Addit ional cal l revenue s fo r loca l an d domest i c long-distanc e call s ove r an d above th e 
pulses provide d fre e a s part o f prepaymen t amounte d t o $  2,109 m i n 1999 , represent in g 
6 8 . 6 % o f PST N revenue s o r 5 9 . 4 % o f gross te lecommunicat ion s revenue . 
All tariff s ar e appl icable o n a  pe r puls e basis , a l thoug h subscr iber s hav e bee n use d t o 
convert ing internationa l cal l tariff s int o th e corresponding t ime-relate d tariffs . T h e tariff 
per puls e i s unitary an d has regularly bee n adjuste d fo r inflation . 
A n analysi s o f tariff s fo r loca l call s suggest s modes t increase s sinc e 1996 . Howeve r 
similarly, loca l cal l charge s remai n modes t b y internationa l standards . Fo r instance , 
peak t im e cost s pe r minute increase d fro m $0.014 7 i n 199 6 t o $0.021 3 i n 1999 . O n the 
other hand , pea k t im e nationa l long-distanc e charge s ove r 10 0 k m decl ine d fro m 
$0.1955 t o $0.160 2 an d are also modes t b y internationa l standards . 
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Table -7 : Nationa l Cal l Tariff s (pe r minut e equivalent ) 1 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
(in cents per minute ) Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
Local 1.47 0.88 2.12 1.27 1.95 1.17 2.13 1.27 
Metropolitan 1.95 1.17 2.75 1.65 2.52 1.51 2.13 1.27 
Intra-city 7.33 4.4 9.73 5.84 8.91 5.35 8.01 4.8 
Up to 10 0 km 11.73 7.04 15.56 9.34 14.26 8.56 12.82 7.69 
Over 10 0 km 19.55 11.73 23.35 14.06 21.4 12.89 16.02 9.61 
To GSM 29.9 29.9 38.91 38.91 35.66 35.66 32.05 32.05 
To NMT 19.93 11.96 23.35 14.06 21.4 12.89 16.02 9.61 
(1) Figure s base d o n year en d exchange rates , puls e charges an d pulse lengths, includin g VA T (15%). 
Internat ional cal l charge s a t pea k t im e rang e betwee n $0.3 0 an d $1.1 8 dependin g o n 
the dest inat ion . Whi l e abou t 5 4 % o f th e outgoin g traffi c i s dest ine d t o E U , 6 4% o f th e 
incoming traffi c or iginate s fro m EU . The pea k t im e pe r minut e charge s fo r th e outgoin g 
traffic i s $0.4 6 fo r E U and Wester n Europea n countr ies . 
Table-8 : Historica l Internationa l Cal l Charge s (tariff s pe r minute ) 
1997 1998 1999 
Charge 
Band 













US U S 
Cents Cent s 
TL 
Category 1 80,500 40 64,500 32 107,250 37 85,750 30 160,750 30 128,60 0 2 3 
Category 2 125,000 62 80,500 40 166,750 58 107,250 37 250,000 46 160,75 0 3 0 
Category 3 187,500 94 150,000 75 250,000 87 200,000 70 375,000 70 300,00 0 5 5 
Category 4 321,500 161 250,000 125 428,750 149 333,500 116 642,850 118 500,00 0 9 2 
Category-1:Bosnia &  Herzegovina , Bulgaria , Greece , Hungary , Macedonia , Moldov a 
Category-2:Albania, Algeria , Azerbaijan, Czec h Republic , Estonia , Georgia, Gibraltar, Kyrgyzstan , Iran , Latvia , Libya,Malta , 
Morocco, Romania , Syria , Tajikistan , Turkmenistan , Slova k Republic , Tunisia , Ukraine , Uzbekistan , an d W E 
Category-3:Canada, Israel , Russia , Kazakhstan , Tataristan , USA , an d othe r countrie s wit h countr y cod e " 1 " 
Category-4:Iceland, Lithuania , an d al l othe r countrie s (unles s indicate d above) . 
3.2.4. Mobil e Service s 
Mobi le te lephon y service s i n Turke y ar e currentl y provide d b y Tur k Te leko m ( N M T ) , 
Turkcel l ( G S M ) , an d Tels i m (GSM) . Tur k Te lekom' s mobi l e service s compr is e thre e mai n 
service a reas : cellular te lephony , pag ing , an d marin e communicat ions . 
Turk Te lekom' s analogu e cellula r service , operate d unde r th e NM T 45 0 Standard , 
commenced operat ion s i n 1986 . T h e servic e wa s initiall y promote d primari l y a s a  ca r 
te lephone product . A t th e en d o f 1999 , th e syste m ha d a  capaci t y o f 150,00 0 line s an d 
had 121,51 7 subscr ibers . Tarif f s appl icabl e t o th e NM T 45 0 service s hav e steadil y bee n 
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adjusted t o kee p pac e wit h inflation . A s o f Decembe r 1999 , ther e wa s n o connect io n 
charge an d th e monthl y charg e wa s T L 2,000,000 . Durin g pea k hour s (08:0 0 -  18:0 0 
Monday -  Fr iday ) th e charg e fo r a  one-minut e cal l t o an d fro m a n analogu e mobi l e 
phone i s T L 62,500 . Of f -pea k (al l othe r t imes) , th e custome r i s bille d T L 37,50 0 pe r 
minute. Cal l s mad e withi n th e NM T 45 0 networ k ar e charge d a t th e sam e rates . Off -
peak charg e i s no t appl ie d sinc e January 2000 . 
Turkcel l i s th e leadin g G S M cellula r provide r i n Turke y an d rank s a s on e o f th e larges t 
G S M operator s i n Europe , wit h approximate l y 6. 2 mill io n reporte d subscr iber s a s o f 
March 2000 , an d a n approximat e 6 8 % shar e o f th e tota l Turk is h cellula r market . Te ls i m 
had approximatel y 2. 9 mill io n reporte d subscr iber s an d a  3 1 % marke t shar e a s o f Marc h 
2000. Turkcel l an d Tels i m bot h bega n servic e i n 199 4 unde r revenue-shar in g 
agreements. I n Apri l 1998 , bot h signe d l icens e agreement s wit h th e Ministr y o f 
Transportat ion. Th e G S M l icense s wer e grante d fo r 2 5 year s fo r a  l icens e fe e o f 
US$ 50 0 mil l ion . Unde r th e l icenses , bot h operator s ar e entit le d t o col lec t th e revenu e 
generated fro m th e operat io n o f th e G S M systems an d ar e obl igate d t o pa y th e Treasur y 
a monthl y l icens e fe e equa l t o 1 5 % o f gros s revenu e a s def ine d i n th e l icens e 
agreement . Unde r th e interconnect io n agreemen t betwee n th e tw o operator s an d Tur k 
Te lekom, Turkcel l an d Tels i m pa y Tur k Te leko m a n interconnect io n fe e pe r cal l base d o n 
the typ e an d lengt h o f ca l l , an d the y als o pa y fee s fo r othe r services . 
After th e convers io n o f revenu e sharin g agreement s int o l icenses , numbe r o f mobi l e 
subscr ibers boomed . Th i s hug e growt h i n th e marke t stresse d ou t th e nee d fo r 
addit ional l icense s and i n 199 8 th e Ministr y o f Transportat io n decide d t o issu e thre e 
addit ional l icense s i n 180 0 MHz . f requency , on e t o b e awarde d directl y t o Tur k Te lekom . 
T h e Valu e Assessment Commi t tee (VAC ) consist ing o f representat ive s fro m th e Ministr y 
of Transpor ta t ion , th e Undersecretar ia t o f Treasury , th e Capita l Market s B o a r d , th e 
Privatization Administrat io n an d Tur k Te leko m establ ishe d a  min imu m o f $65 0 Mill io n 
l icense value . I n Apri l 2000 , tw o 180 0 MH z l icense s were offere d i n tw o subsequen t 
auct ions. I s Bankas i -Te leco m Italia consort iu m wa s awarde d th e firs t l icens e fo r 
$2 .525bn, whic h se t th e f loo r pric e fo r th e subsequen t auct ion . However , hig h f loo r 
price se t i n th e firs t auct io n le d t o withdrawa l o f al l th e compet i tor s an d th e fourt h 
l icense wa s remove d fro m th e auct io n block . Tur k Te leko m wa s awarde d th e fourt h 
l icense i n Novembe r 200 0 b y payin g th e f loo r pric e se t i n th e firs t auct io n hel d i n Apri l 
2000. 
These recen t deve lopment s i n th e mobi l e communicat io n marke t suggest s tha t 
penetrat ion rat e i s likel y t o mov e u p fro m curren t 1 3 % rat e whic h i s wel l belo w th e 
European average . 
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Table-9: Mobil e Service Revenue s 1996-1999 (Constan t Decembe r 199 9 
Billion TL ) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 1999 
(US$m) ( 2 ) 
GSM services revenues 122,252 253,058 189,287 64,798 119 
Growth (% ) - 107.00% -25.20% -65.80% -
Retained income (after sharing ) 88,525 170,052 136,304 64,257 118 
Subscribers 
Analogue NMT 450 service revenues 8,647 10,680 11,322 9,154 17 
Growth (% ) - 23.50% 6.00% -19.20% -
Subscribers 
Paging revenues 828 1,454 1,858 1,092 2 
Growth (% ) - 75.50% 27.70% -41.20% -
Subscribers 
Marine communications revenue s 2,530 2,966 2,453 1,823 3 
Growth (% ) - 17.20% -17.30% -25.70% -
Total mobile services 134,258 268,159 204,920 76,866 141 
Growth (% ) - 99.70% -23.60% -62.50% -
% o f gross telecom revenu e 10.30% 15.10% 10.20% 4.00% -
(1) Expresse d in terms o f th e purchasin g powe r o f th e Turkis h Lir a i n billion s a t 3 1 Decembe r 1999 . 
(2) 1US $ = 544,300 , a s o f 3 1 Decembe r 1999 . 
Table-10: Mobil e (Car ) Radi o Telephone System s (NM T 450 ) 
3.2.5. Busines s Networ k Service s 
Turk Te leko m offer s it s customer s bot h analogu e an d digita l privat e lease d circuit s tha t 
vary i n spee d fro m 240 0 bp s t o 14 0 Mb s an d ar e avai labl e o n a  2  wir e o r 4  wir e basis . 
At th e en d o f 1999 , ther e wer e 10,44 8 dat a an d 1,44 1 vo ice-ban d lease d dat a circuit s 
between cit ie s withi n th e country . Th e G S M mobi l e operators , Te ls i m an d Turkce l l , ar e 
by fa r th e larges t user s o f lease d lin e services . Othe r importan t customer s ar e banks , 
internet servic e providers , newspapers , an d U lakb im , th e inter-universit y communicat io n 
network. A  7 0 % tarif f d iscoun t o n th e leas e charge s appl ie s t o customer s wit h mor e 
than 50 0 lease d l ines , suc h a s Tels im an d Turkcel l . 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Base stations 364 414 430 496 606 632 
Subscribers 93,503 103,833 113,560 126,659 124,448 121,517 
GSM Systems 
Base stations 192 742 1,107 1,894 2,694 [ ] 
Subscribers 81,968 332,716 692,779 1,483,149 3,250,000 8,424,000 
The revenu e fro m nationa l an d internationa l lease d l ines , excludin g microwav e circuit s 
for televisio n an d radi o distr ibutio n bu t includin g th e circuit s use d b y th e G S M operators , 
amounted t o T L 93 8 b n ( $ 2. 0 m ) i n 1999 . 
3.2.6. Dat a Networ k Service s 
In ligh t o f th e changin g demand s o n th e dat a marke t an d wit h a  v ie w t o adop t th e lates t 
technologies, Tur k Te leko m ha s bee n redesignin g it s dat a network s an d servic e offering s 
around recentl y introduce d A T M platforms . T h e cor e o f it s dat a servic e offerin g i s base d 
on TTnet . TTNe t i s Tur k Te lekom' s nationa l f iber-opti c backbone , wh ich , onc e 
comple ted , wil l provid e hig h bandwidt h I P service s withi n an d betwee n al l majo r urba n 
centers i n Turkey . TTNe t commence d operat ion s a t th e beginnin g o f 199 9 an d th e firs t 
of fou r stage s wa s full y complete d i n Decembe r 1999 . I t represent s a  majo r ste p i n th e 
company 's plan s t o offe r hig h bandwidt h Interne t an d dat a service s i n Turkey . Du e t o 
the importanc e o f dat a communicat ion s withi n Tur k Te lekom' s developmen t strategy , 
the compan y ha s chose n t o rollou t TTNe t a s a  whol l y owne d enti ty , withou t recours e t o 
the revenu e sharin g agreements . Th e backbon e i s currentl y full y redundan t an d i s base d 
on 15 5 Mbp s A T M ring s wit h othe r citie s connecte d usin g 3 4 o r 2  Mbp s A T M links . I n 
a l l , TTNe t ha s 14 0 POPs . Prio r t o deve lopmen t o f TTNe t , interne t backbon e wa s 
operated b y Globa l One . 
At th e en d o f 1997 , Tur k Te leko m bega n operat in g a  f ram e rela y networ k tha t provide s 
cheaper dat a communicat io n a t a  highe r speed . F ram e rela y service s ar e bein g offere d 
using th e X .2 5 networ k backbon e an d th e TTne t network . Coverag e i s current l y l imite d 
to 1 0 mai n citie s (capacit ie s o f u p t o 3 4 Mb s o n th e backbone ) al thoug h countrywid e 
access i s avai labl e vi a PST N acces s line s (capacit ie s limite d t o 6 4 kbs) . Th e compan y 
has installe d 1 9 passpor t module s fo r h igh-spee d connect iv i t y ensur in g a  bas e wit h fiv e 
modules (wit h a  capaci t y o f 3 4 Mbs ) an d 1 4 module s wit h a  capaci t y o f 2  Mbs . I t als o 
offers Franc e Rela y Service s ove r it s TTne t network , an d i t i s o n thi s networ k tha t it s 
expansion plan s ar e focused . 
Turk ish Packe t Switchin g Dat a Networ k (TURPAK ) wa s pu t int o servic e a t th e en d o f 
1989. Subscr iber s connec t t o Turpa k vi a a  dial-u p mode m o r a  lease d line . Th e 
network cover s al l o f Turke y an d offer s direc t connect ion s t o Italy , Be lg ium , Azerba i jan , 
United K i n g d o m , Unite d States , Germany , Macedon ia , and Uzbekistan . Vi a thes e direc t 
connect ions, Turpa k i s l inke d t o a  tota l o f 6 8 countr ie s an d 7 2 networks . A s o f Marc h 
2000 , Turpa k ha s 15 9 acces s modules , fou r switchin g modules , an d capaci t y o f 16,59 2 
ports. Tur k Te leko m i s plannin g t o increas e thi s capaci t y t o 30,00 0 port s b y th e en d o f 
the yea r 2000 . A t th e en d o f 1999 , th e est imate d numbe r o f dial-u p modem s avai labl e 
for packe t switche d dat a appl icat ion s i n th e countr y wa s 20,647 . Turpa k ha d 14,53 0 
subscr ibers an d 1,42 8 dial-u p subscr iber s a t th e en d o f 1999 . Turpak ' s connect ion , 
rental , an d usag e tariff s var y wit h th e durat io n o f th e connect io n t im e an d wit h th e 
amount o f transferre d data . Revenue s fro m Turpa k amounte d t o T L 55,99 2 b n 
($ 102. 8 m ) i n 1999 . 
The commercia l implementat io n o f Integrate d Service s Digita l Networ k ( ISDN ) Service s 
in Turke y depend s o n th e progressiv e upgrad e o f th e Tur k Te leko m networ k t o CCITT ' s 
Number 7  Signall in g system . A t th e en d o f 1999 , 35 7 exchange s ha d bee n upgrade d t o 
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the Numbe r 7  Signall in g sys tem , an d b y th e en d o f 200 0 th e Compan y expect s th e 
Number 7  roll-ou t t o b e a lmos t complet e throughou t th e network . I n Decembe r 1999 , 
approximately 2,29 5 Pr imar y (PRI ) ISD N acces s line s an d 12 0 Basi c (BRI ) ISD N line s 
were i n service . Addit iona l 6,00 0 PR I port s an d 5,00 0 B A port s ar e planne d t o b e 
installed i n 2000 . A s o f Decembe r 1999 , th e charge s fo r pr imar y (PRI ) t o th e ISD N 
network wer e a n initia l connect io n fe e o f $  1,386. 8 an d a  monthl y renta l fe e o f $  166. 4 
and th e charge s fo r basi c acces s (BRI ) t o th e ISD N networ k wer e a n initia l connect io n 
fee o f $  92.4 5 an d a  monthl y renta l fe e o f $  11.09 , respectively . Norma l PST N charge s 
apply fo r usage . Est imate d numbe r o f ISD N subscr iber s i n Turke y i s 67,510 . 
3.2.7 Satellit e Service s 
Turk Te leko m own s an d operate s tw o satel l i tes , Turksa t 1 B an d Turksa t 1C . Throug h 
Eurasiasat , a  join t ventur e wit h Aerospat ia le , Turk Te leko m i s plannin g t o launc h a  thir d 
satell ite (Turksa t 2A) . 
Historical ly, th e developmen t an d performanc e o f th e company ' s satellit e service s hav e 
been constraine d b y th e central ize d proces s o f approvin g capita l expendi tur e decis ion s 
of Stat e Enterpr ise s an d b y Tur k Te lekom' s obl igat io n t o provid e service s t o Turk is h 
Radio Televis io n (TRT ) o n signif icantl y d isadvantageou s terms . However , recentl y 
approved La w 439 7 ha s transferre d th e responsibi l i t y o f th e t ransmissio n o f t ransmit ter s 
f rom Tur k Te leko m t o T R T . Therefore , Tur k Te leko m expect s t o b e abl e t o charg e T R T 
on non-exclusiv e term s fo r thi s service . 
In a n effor t t o establ is h greate r f inancia l an d operat iona l au tonom y i n it s satellit e 
bus iness, Tur k Te leko m entere d int o a  join t ventur e wit h Alcate l SpaceCo m fo r th e 
deve lopment , launch , an d operat io n o f Eurasiasa t i n 1996 . A t th e t im e o f th e kick-of f o f 
the join t venture , Tur k Te leko m owne d 5 1 % o f Eurasiasa t wit h th e balanc e owne d b y 
Alcatel SpaceCom . Sinc e then , Alcate l ha s reduce d it s stak e t o 2 5 % an d Tur k Te leko m 
increased t o 7 5 % . Tur k Te leko m expect s tha t th e au tonomou s statu s o f Eurasiasa t wil l 
provide i t wit h th e market in g an d tariffin g flexibil it y tha t ar e neede d fo r th e successfu l 
operat ion o f a  commerc ia l satell it e service . Whi l e th e initia l privatizatio n strateg y 
bundled T U R K S A T i n Tur k Te lekom , nationa l securit y concern s voiced b y th e arm y le d t o 
the decisio n t o dives t th e divisio n a s a  separat e entity . T h e decisio n wa s incorporate d 
into th e amende d la w i n Ma y 2001 . 
3.2.8 Interne t Service s 
Accord ing t o dat a provide d b y Tur k Te lekom , Turke y ha d ove r 10 0 interne t servic e 
providers ( ISPs ) a s o f en d o f 199 9 wit h approximatel y ove r 400,00 0 customers . ISP s us e 
leased line s t o acces s th e TTne t network . Certai n ISP s hav e establ ishe d thei r ow n 
international connect ion s throug h internationa l carrier s l icense d t o operat e i n Turke y 
( through th e company ' s internationa l gateways ) suc h a s Sprint , G loba lOne , UUnet , etc . 
Turkey demonstrate s tha t relativel y hig h main- l in e connect iv i t y level s d o no t ensur e 
internet growth . A  lac k o f governmen t initiativ e i n promot in g interne t awareness , lo w 
PC penetrat io n an d compute r l iterac y an d inadequat e compet i t io n hav e bee n mai n 
inhibitors. Turkey ' s interne t penetrat io n rat e i s belo w 1 % an d wel l behin d develope d 
economies. However , subscr ibe r growt h rate s hav e bee n hig h an d a s measure d b y tota l 
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accounts , interne t servic e market s ar e expecte d t o expan d substantial l y withi n nex t fiv e 
y e a r s 1 6 . 
Since Ma y 1998 , Tur k Te leko m starte d leavin g internationa l connect iv i t y t o ISPs , 
al lowing fo r a n expansio n o f th e internationa l I P traffi c an d preventin g furthe r 
bott lenecks o n th e P S T N . Revenu e from interne t acces s amounte d t o T L 2,68 7 b n ( $ 4. 9 
m) i n 1999 . 
Broadband infrastructur e remain s extremel y underdevelope d i n Turkey . Effort s t o 
develop DS L market s wer e initiate d i n 2000 . Th e busines s secto r i s expecte d t o b e th e 
main sourc e o f deman d fo r broadban d technologies . Sinc e ther e i s ver y littl e CAT V 
infrastructure, cabl e modem s wil l no t offe r compet i t io n t o ISD N o r DS L an y t im e soon . 
Direct internationa l I P acces s vi a satell it e l ink s i s illega l whe n no t establ ishe d throug h 
Turk Te leko m SCP C connect ions . Ther e ar e a  fe w ISP s offerin g satellit e broadban d 
technologies, bu t hig h cost s an d technologica l l imitation s sugges t tha t a  widesprea d us e 
is unlikely . 
1 6 Turkey : Telecommunications , Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  Ma y 5 t h 2000 . 
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4- Prospect s fo r Secto r Refor m and Privatizatio n Strategy 
A n efficien t an d innovativ e te lecommunicat ion s industr y i s crucia l i n attainin g highe r 
levels o f economi c development . Economi c impac t o f te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n 
goes beyon d improvin g cont iguou s industr ies , however ; i t contr ibute s t o th e entir e 
processes o f economi c deve lopment , fo r i t i s instrumenta l t o compet i t iv e evolut io n o f 
other periphera l industries . 
Privatization i n te lecommunicat ion s i s only a n initia l ste p toward s th e goa l o f evolut io n o f 
an efficien t industry . I t i s n o coincidenc e the n tha t a lmos t invariably , 
te lecommunicat ions privatization s ar e accompanie d b y sweepin g restructurin g o f th e 
industry t o achiev e highl y compet i t iv e markets . I t i s crucia l tha t privatizatio n plan s i n 
te lecommunicat ions secto r shoul d embrac e a  visio n beyon d th e mer e transfe r o f 
ownership an d establ is h a  quic k pat h t o a  highl y compet i t iv e marke t structure . Polic y 
makers wh o ca n successful l y us e thi s opportun e too l wil l attai n ful l benefi t s o f a n 
economic dr ive r f ro m achievin g highl y compet i t iv e markets , other s wil l fai l a s fo r t hem , 
privatization remain s a s a  simpl e transfe r o f ownership . Fur thermore , eve n th e f lawles s 
reform plan s an d r igorou s implementat io n schedule s create result s wit h signif ican t lags . 
So th e ris k remains , an d Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n i s no t immun e t o 
these concerns . 
The onse t o f Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s secto r refor m wit h th e introductio n o f 
te lecommunicat ions la w an d ensuin g privatizatio n o f Tur k Te leko m wil l shap e th e 
industry i n th e year s t o com e an d arguabl y wil l pla y a  signif ican t rol e i n th e Turk is h 
economic development . I n thi s sect ion , potentia l implicat ion s o f th e privatizatio n 
strategy an d companio n lega l f ramewor k tha t se t th e pat h fo r secto r refor m wil l b e 
addressed. A lso , th e diff icultie s an d problem s li e ahea d i n thi s pat h wil l b e art iculate d 
bearing o n th e culminat in g ev idenc e e lsewhere. 
A brie f revie w o f t rend s i n te lecommunicat ion s privatization s aroun d th e glob e suggest s 
that government s adop t tw o commo n st rategies : Th e firs t strateg y entai l s incrementa l 
public offer ing s ove r a  fe w year s tha t reduc e th e governmen t stak e ste p b y ste p t o 
negligible level s wit h a  fina l goa l o f ful l d ivestment . I n thi s opt ion , ther e i s n o 
immediate chang e i n th e managemen t o f th e f i rm , an d presumabl y shareholder s ar e 
conf ident tha t th e exist in g managemen t i s professiona l an d th e compan y ca n operat e 
free fro m politica l interference . Te lecommunicat ion s monopol ie s i n mos t develope d 
countr ies suc h a s Deutsch e Te lecom , Telefonic a o f Spa in , Franc e Te lecom , NT T o f 
J a p a n , Britis h Te leco m etc . wer e privatize d ste p b y ste p withou t signif ican t managemen t 
shakeouts. 
T h e secon d opt ion , block-sal e strategy , require s bloc k sal e o f share s t o a  strategi c 
partner tha t i s fol lowe d b y a  sequenc e o f publi c offerings . Publi c offering s ensuin g th e 
block sal e ar e intende d t o reduc e th e governmen t shar e gradual l y whi l e capital izin g o n 
enhanced eff icienc y an d reputat io n buildin g i n th e pos t privatizatio n per iod . The y als o 
give th e strategi c partne r a n opportuni t y t o increas e it s investmen t i n th e compan y 
through preferentia l al locat ion s dur in g th e offerings . W e identif ie d 7 5 bloc k sale s i n 
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te lecommunicat ions privatization s i n 4 8 count r ies 1 7 . Strategi c partner s wer e offere d 
ownership right s rangin g fro m 2 0 % t o 1 0 0 % o f th e company . Whi l e 3 0 o f th e 7 5 bloc k 
sales involve d les s tha n 5 0 % o f th e shar e transfer s t o strategi c investors , i n 4 5 case s 
strategic investor s wer e offere d mor e tha n 5 0 % o f th e shares . 
In strategi c sa les , privatizin g government s see k transfe r o f manageria l know-how , 
technological infusio n an d capita l injectio n b y th e strategi c partner . O f ten , government s 
strive t o attrac t exper ience d mult inationa l operator s i n join t venture s o r consor t ium s 
with loca l part icipation . I n genera l , strategi c partner s ar e give n substantia l manageria l 
control i n orde r t o b e abl e t o implemen t soun d commerc ia l strategie s fre e fro m politica l 
interference. Te lecommunicat ion s privatization s i n Sout h Af r ica , Peru , Mex ico , 
Venezue la , Be lg ium , Hungary , Slovaki a resulte d wit h transfe r o f ful l manager ia l contro l 
to th e strategi c partne r despit e minorit y ownershi p o f th e strategi c partne r ( les s tha n 
5 0 % ) . I n som e othe r cases , suc h a s I re land , Latvi a an d Cub a strategi c partner s wer e 
rendered limite d manageria l control . 
Initially, Turk is h governmen t adopte d a  two-stag e privatizatio n strategy . Firs t stag e 
would star t wit h a  2 0 % bloc k sal e t o a  strategi c partne r alon g wit h 5 % an d 1 0 % 
al locat ions t o employee s an d th e genera l directorat e o f posta l offic e funds , respectively . 
A 1 4 % publi c offerin g woul d complet e th e d ivestmen t o f 4 9 % o f th e Tur k Te lekom . 
Government woul d retai n 5 1 % ownership . However , lac k o f interes t f ro m qualif ie d 
consort ia includin g foreig n mult inationa l operator s force d th e governmen t t o reconside r 
the siz e o f th e shar e t o b e offere d t o th e strategi c partne r an d counci l o f minister s 
increased i t t o 3 3 . 5 % i n Decembe r 2 0 0 0 1 8 . Propose d al locat ion s t o employee s an d th e 
general directorat e o f posta l syste m fund s wer e no t revised . 
A s i t wa s indicate d earl ier , i t i s no t uncommo n fo r government s t o maintai n a  residua l 
minority o r majori t y stak e i n te lecommunicat ion s privatizations . A  numbe r o f factor s 
explain wh y government s retai n shares . Include d i n thes e ar e nationa l securit y 
concerns , al leviat in g politica l opposi t ion , signif ican t valuat ions , an d mos t important ly , 
expectat ions t o sel l remainin g governmen t share s i n subsequen t shar e offerings . I f th e 
expected benefi t s f ro m privatizatio n ar e real ised , governments ca n generat e substantia l 
revenues b y cashin g thei r share s throug h publi c offering s o r privat e sale s t o th e 
consort ia. 
However , unti l th e governmen t share s ar e l iquidate d an d divestmen t i s comple ted , 
government wil l hav e a  rol e i n th e post-privat izat io n governance . Th e natur e o f thi s rol e 
has implicat ions . Th e firs t issu e i s th e possibil i t y o f powe r imbalance . Suppos e that th e 
strategic partne r an d th e governmen t becom e majo r shareholder s i n th e privatize d 
monopoly. Th e emergin g governanc e structur e tha t ca n b e descr ibe d b y thi s co -
habitance i s no t fre e o f tensions . Dispute s aris e ofte n i n right s t o strategi c an d day-to ¬
day managemen t o f th e f i rm . Natural ly , strategi c partne r wh o come s t o th e partnershi p 
with a  substantia l equit y investmen t an d potential l y a  heft y commi tmen t t o expan d th e 
infrastructure insist s o n manageria l contro l o f th e operat ions . O n th e othe r hand , th e 
government presse s fo r clou t t o appoin t director s an d officer s consisten t wit h it s 
1 7 P I Database . 
1 8 Thi s reconfiguratio n implie d tha t the propose d IP O of 14 % o f share s were adde d to th e origina l stak e reserve d fo r 
strategic partner . Instea d th e IP O scaled back to 0 .5 % o f th e shares . 
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sharehold ing. Th e resolutio n o f thi s potentia l tensio n i s paramoun t t o a  successfu l 
privatization. T h e governmen t i s naturall y concerne d abou t th e pos t privatizatio n 
political impl icat ion s o f th e strategi c sale . Therefore , i t i s mot ivate d t o asser t contro l t o 
avoid politicall y costl y outcomes . Thi s motivat io n i s mor e pronounce d unde r th e 
xenophobic pressure s an d concern s abou t nationa l security . T h e absenc e o f a  credibl e 
and establ ishe d regulato r furthe r contr ibute s t o th e proble m an d governmen t contro l i n 
critical decis ion-makin g i s perceive d t o b e th e onl y solut io n t o al leviat e th e concern s 
listed above . Fro m th e perspect iv e o f th e strategi c partner , thi s possibil i t y o f politica l 
interference represent s a  signif ican t ris k tha t woul d b e factore d int o valuat io n o f th e 
stake i t purchases . Th i s ris k become s eve n mor e debil i tatin g whe n ther e i s n o clea r 
calendar fo r th e d ivestmen t o f th e governmen t s take , which i n som e case s i s envis ione d 
to remai n a t 5 1 % . Furthe r reduct io n i n governmen t shar e ofte n require s amendment s 
in th e la w an d par l iamentar y approval . 
Proposed privatizatio n strategie s o f Tur k Te leko m suffere d fro m thi s governanc e risk . 
Mult inational operators , wh o woul d otherwis e b e intereste d in , wer e reluctan t t o tak e 
this risk , particularl y sinc e the y wer e unde r sever e investo r scrutin y du e t o depresse d 
international te lecommunicat ion s market . A n announcemen t mad e fro m th e pr im e 
minister's offic e o n Decembe r 1 1 t h , 2000 , indicate d tha t th e prospect iv e partne r o f Tur k 
Te lekom woul d hav e th e majori t y vot e i n a  commit te e whic h woul d decid e o n issue s 
such a s personnel , f inancia l matters , investment s an d appointmen t o f senio r managers . 
However , d isagreement s amon g coali t io n partie s regardin g ho w muc h contro l th e 
foreign partner s woul d exer t persisted . Whe n th e governanc e proble m couple d wit h th e 
February 1 9 t h f inancia l cr isis , Turk Te leko m privatizatio n strateg y practicall y becam e a n 
impossible proposit ion . 
It becam e increasingl y clea r tha t unde r th e curren t marke t condi t ions , a  controversia l 
d ivestment desig n wit h signif ican t governanc e ris k coul d no t possibl y facil i tat e 
privatization o f Tur k T e l e k o m 1 9 . Recogniz in g the diff icult y o f privatizin g Tur k Te leko m 
under curren t marke t condi t ions , th e governmen t starte d t o conside r divestin g 5 1 % o f 
the company . A  consensu s on th e amendmen t t o th e exist in g la w wa s reached . Th e 
amended la w whic h wa s passe d o n Ma y 14 t h , ha s create d signif ican t flexibilit y i n th e 
privatization desig n an d strateg y b y al lowin g 1 0 0 % divestmen t provide d tha t th e 
government i s grante d a  golde n shar e wit h vet o power . O n th e othe r hand , i t impose d 
restrictions o n foreig n contro l b y limitin g foreig n ownershi p a t 4 5 % . Al thoug h thi s 
strategy ma y attrac t mult inationa l investors , i t face s a  seriou s lega l chal lenge , which ca n 
only b e overcom e b y amendment s i n te lecommunicat ion s la w an d relate d art icle s o f 
const i tut ion. I f th e Turk is h governmen t ca n prevai l ove r thes e lega l hurdle s i s ye t t o b e 
seen. 
T h e alternativ e d ivestmen t strategie s d iscusse d abov e i s onl y on e o f man y importan t 
attr ibutes o f te lecommunicat io n privatizations . Anothe r vita l d imensio n o f th e 
privatization strateg y i s relate d t o th e desig n o f post-privat izat io n marke t structure . A s 
we emphas ize d above , privatizatio n i s onl y a  ste p toward s achievin g a  compet i t iv e 
industry structur e tha t shoul d b e fol lowe d b y a  cus tom-mad e regulator y f ramewor k i n 
19 
We ar e stil l no t sur e i f the government , polic y makers , and legislator s fully comprehen d the issue s surroundin g th e 
privatization o f Turk Telekom. 
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the ligh t o f internationa l exper ience . A  successfu l privatizatio n strateg y shoul d establ is h 
the shortes t pat h t o th e compet i t ion . Recen t technologica l deve lopment s hav e 
dramatical ly increase d th e opt ion s avai labl e t o governments . T h e globa l exper ienc e i n 
compet i t ive nationa l long-distanc e an d internationa l service s suggest s tha t thes e 
segments ar e immediat e candidate s fo r compet i t io n wit h fe w compl icat ions . Eve n th e 
prospects fo r successfu l compet i t ion i n th e loca l loo p ar e p romis ing . 2 0 
Telecommunicat ions privatizatio n i n earl y 1990 s focuse d o n introducin g compet i t io n i n 
primari ly long-distanc e an d internationa l service s whi l e maintainin g loca l loo p 
monopol ies. I n som e case s lik e Argent ina , incumben t operato r wa s divide d alon g th e 
geographic line s an d duopol ie s wer e create d i n th e loca l loop . Th e duopol ie s share d 
ownership i n long - distanc e an d internationa l service s wer e del ivere d throug h a  join t 
venture. I n other s lik e Chi le , divisio n cam e alon g th e servic e l ines , an d eac h servic e 
segment wa s opene d t o compet i t ion . O n th e othe r hand , som e larg e operator s suc h a s 
Te lmex wer e sol d i n a  bundl e t o mak e th e fir m mor e attractiv e t o foreig n investor s an d 
to avoi d legal , administrat iv e an d account in g problem s tha t woul d hav e delaye d th e 
privatization. I n thi s sense , decis io n t o privatiz e Tur k Te leko m i n a  bundl e resemble s t o 
Te lmex pr ivat izat ion , wher e th e compan y wa s divide d neithe r alon g geographi c no r 
service l ines . Th e motivat io n fo r thi s strateg y i s clear : A  divisio n alon g th e geographi c 
lines o r servic e line s coul d rende r som e part s o f th e compan y unattract iv e t o investors . 
Th is i s particularl y tru e fo r geographi c divisio n sinc e mos t o f th e Tur k Te leko m revenue s 
are generate d i n a  fe w concentrate d metropol i ta n areas . W e believ e th e decisio n t o 
keep th e service s togethe r wa s als o motivate d b y th e tradit iona l nestin g o f al l thes e 
services i n th e Tur k Te leko m organizat iona l structure , wher e a  break-u p woul d creat e 
substantial account in g an d administrat iv e compl icat ion s an d furthe r dela y th e 
privatization o f th e company . 
A l though a  bundle d sal e strateg y i s mor e attractiv e t o investor s an d ease s th e sal e 
process b y increasin g th e marketabi l i t y o f th e f i rm , i t i s inherentl y mor e prohibit iv e fo r 
introduction o f compet i t io n i n th e sector . Whi l e th e datel in e se t b y th e 
te lecommunicat ions la w fo r th e secto r refor m suggest s tha t th e Turk is h 
te lecommunicat ions marke t woul d b e ope n t o compet i t io n i n al l segment s o f voic e an d 
data t ransmissio n b y Decembe r 2003 , globa l exper ienc e indicate s tha t incumbent s tr y 
hard t o maintai n o r creat e ne w entr y barriers . Incumben t Publi c Te lephon e Operator s 
(PTOs) exploi t thei r compet i t iv e advantage s somet ime s b y violat in g th e compet i t io n 
laws. Th i s i s mor e likel y t o b e th e case , i f th e incumben t control s th e entir e network . I n 
a recen t O E C D researc h paper , Boylau d an d Nico le t t i 2 1 argu e tha t incumbent s cont inu e 
to dominat e th e marke t year s afte r th e marke t open ing , particularl y i n th e loca l loo p 
where th e entr y barrier s ar e strongest . The y clai m tha t despit e extensiv e l iberal izat ion , 
the PTO s retai n a n averag e marke t shar e o f ove r 9 0 pe r cen t i n t run k serv ices , 8 6 pe r 
cent i n internationa l serv ices , 93 pe r cen t i n mobi l e analogu e service s and 6 6 pe r cen t i n 
mobi le digita l services . 
T h e O E C D exper ienc e summar ize d i n Boylau d an d Nicolett i stud y suggest s tha t produc t 
market compet i t io n an d credibl e threa t o f l iberalizatio n hav e signif ican t impac t o n 
2 0 Competitiv e servic e provision i n loca l loo p ha s already begu n i n various location s i n the U.S . 
2 1 Boyleud , Oliver and Guisepp e Nicolett i (2000) , "Regulation , Market Structur e an d Performanc e inTelecommunications", 
OECD Economics  Department  Working  Paper  Series  No : 237 , 2000 . 
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productivi ty increase s an d quali t y enhancement . T h e deadl in e fo r fre e entr y i n al l 
segments o f th e Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s marke t wa s se t a s Decembe r 3 1 , 200 3 i n 
te lecommunicat ions law . However , th e amende d la w st ipulate s tha t th e monopol y 
rights o f Tur k Te leko m ca n b e maintaine d unti l thi s dat e onl y i f i t i s stil l majori t y owne d 
by th e government . Accord in g t o th e amende d law , privatizatio n o f mor e tha n 5 1 % o f 
the compan y befor e Decembe r 2003 , wil l t r igge r th e fre e entr y int o al l voic e an d dat a 
segments i n addit io n t o a l read y deregulate d valu e adde d services . 
The stric t imposit io n o f th e deadl ine s b y th e governmen t i s crucia l t o discipl in e th e 
incumbent monopol y an d t o introduc e compet i t io n i n th e market . Th e responsibi l i t y o f 
the ne w te lecommunicat ion s regulato r wil l b e paramoun t t o enforc e compet i t iv e 
practices dur in g th e incumbent ' s effort s t o defen d it s markets . A s i t wa s ment ione d 
earl ier, ant i -compet i t iv e practice s b y th e incumbent s shoul d b e expecte d onc e th e 
market i s opene d t o compet i t ion . Th e amende d la w shifte d th e powe r balanc e i n secto r 
regulat ion dramatical l y b y transferr in g th e authori t y t o sig n concessio n agreements fro m 
Ministry o f Transportat io n t o th e regulato r an d strengthene d th e regulator ' s posit ion . 
Te lecommunicat ions privatizatio n exper ienc e i n Turk is h settin g shoul d capital iz e o n th e 
O E C D exper ienc e an d avoi d replicatio n o f er roneou s secto r reform s suc h a s th e Mexica n 
exper ience, whic h essential l y s temme d fro m regulator y capture . A lmos t a  decad e afte r 
privatization o f Te lmex , compet i t io n o f Mexica n te lecommunicat ions marke t i s stil l stifle d 
and governmen t regulator s hav e onl y recentl y announce d rule s whic h wil l reduc e th e 
near-monopoly posit io n o f Te lme x a s th e mai n provide r o f local , long - d is tance , cel lula r 
and interne t services . 2 2 
Another importan t attr ibut e o f th e te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n desig n i s th e 
participation o f a n exper ience d foreig n te lecommunicat ion s operato r i n th e biddin g 
consort ia. Th i s ha s bee n a  standar d strateg y i n emerg in g marke t te lecommunicat io n 
privatizations t o facil itat e technolog y an d capita l injection s t o th e privatize d company . 
A l though th e Turk is h governmen t seem s t o valu e eff icienc y enhancin g capita l an d 
technology infusion s expecte d fro m mult inationa l operators , i t i s als o concerne d abou t 
the foreig n contro l o f th e incumben t operator . Th i s tensio n wa s reflecte d i n th e revisio n 
of th e law , whic h a ime d t o reconcil e thes e tension s b y limitin g th e foreig n participatio n 
by 4 5 % . 
A brie f revie w o f comparat iv e operat iona l eff icienc y indicator s suggest s tha t Tur k 
Te lekom ha s substantia l roo m fo r eff icienc y enhancement s (se e Tab le-11 ) tha t ca n b e 
unleashed b y a  wel l -designe d privatizatio n benefit in g fro m th e exper ienc e o f a  worl d 
class operator . Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s marke t i s clearl y a n attractiv e marke t fo r 
mult inational te lecommunicat ion s operator s becaus e o f it s curren t siz e an d growt h 
opportuni t ies (se e Figure-5) . It s f ixe d lin e penetrat io n rat e a t 2 8 % i s stil l wel l belo w th e 
E U averag e an d th e deman d fo r service s i s growin g rap id ly . 2 3 Th e marke t als o offer s 
signif icant opportuni t ie s i n relativel y underdevelope d dat a communicat ion s an d mobi l e 
segment. Interne t usag e a t 1 % an d mobil e penetrat io n rat e a t 2 3 % ar e fa r belo w th e 
O E C D o r E U ave rages2 4 . 
2 2 Andre a Mandel-Campbell , "Telmex Seekin g Injunction Over Stat e Curbs" , Financia l Times, October,6th 2000 . 
2 3 IT U Yearbook , 2000 . 
2 4 Doin g Busines s i n Turkey: E-Commerce , EIU E-Busines s Forum , Ma y 5 t h 2000 . 
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Table -11: Comparat iv e Efficienc y i n Te lecommunicat ion s 
Operat ions 
Country Teledensity Revenue/Employee Line/Employee 
Argentina 20.00 $311,199 336 
Brazil 12.05 $177,071 236 
Chile 16.57 $250,781 806 
CR 36.39 $82,290 153 
Egypt 6.02 $19,528 74 
Greece 52.22 $157,460 252 
Korea 43.27 $176,703 331 
Mexico 10.30 $162,594 179 
Poland 22.76 $40,192 121 
Portugal 41.35 $167,363 192 
Turkey 25.41 $46,849 233 
Source: IT U Yearboo k 2000 . 
On th e othe r hand , a s i t wa s indicate d above , mult inationa l operator s ma y hesitat e t o 
enter th e marke t du e t o uncertaint ie s associate d wit h futur e regulator y envi ronmen t an d 
cont inued governmen t involvemen t i n th e managemen t o f Tur k T e l e k o m . A  secon d 
important deterren t i s th e mount in g deb t level s o f mult inationa l te lecommunicat ion s 
operators an d sudde n reversa l o f appet i t e t o f inanc e te lecommunicat ion s deal s i n th e 
f inancial markets . 
Figure-5: Turkish Telecommunications Revenue s and Investment s 
T h e accumulate d deb t i n th e secto r i s projecte d t o b e i n th e neighborhoo d o f $ 2 5 0 b n . 2 5 
Highly indebte d larg e operator s suc h a s A T & T , Franc e Te lecom , Deutsch e Te leco m an d 
Brit ish Te leco m hav e littl e roo m t o expan d int o ne w operat ion s becaus e o f l imitation s o f 
f inancing (se e Tab le-12) . 
2 5 " A $250b n Gamble, " Survey o f Corporat e Finance , The  Economist,  Januar y 27 t h 2001 , p p 10-11 . 
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Table-12: Mel tdow n i n Marke t Valu e o f Majo r Mult inational s Operator s 
Company Country Market Value* Market 
Value** 
Vodafone Air-touc h UK $291,934.90 $166,897 
NTT Japan $207,261.50 $98,773 
Deutsche Teleko m Germany $199,716.40 $75,800 
France Teleco m France $158,967.30 $60,700 
AT&T US $156,742.60 $88,700 
S B C Communication s US $143,624.10 $152,300 
British Teleco m UK $114,210.10 $56,800 
MCI WorldCo m US $113,519.60 $49,200 
Bellsouth US $97,503.00 $77,700 
Bell Atlanti c US $96,043.90 $128,900 
Telefonica Spain $76,128.30 $73,300 
Telecom Itali a Italia $74,045.80 $67,600 
B C E Canada $64,392.00 $21,200 
Telstra Australia $57,613.50 $43,100 
K P N Netherlands $52,368.30 $12,400 
Sprint Fo n Group US $45,810.10 $19,500 
Source: Financia l Times and Yahoo Finance ; *  a s of 24 Apri l 2000 , * * a s of 23-March , 200 1 
In addit io n t o these , Tur k Te leko m privatizatio n over lap s wit h a  perio d o f congeste d 
pipeline wher e othe r government s at temp t t o privatiz e incumben t operators . Onl y i n 
Europe an d Commonwea l t h o f Independen t State s (CIS ) ther e ar e 4 5 t ransact ion s i n th e 
pipeline includin g publi c of fer ings , privat e sale s an d 3 G l i censes 2 6 . Mor e tha n hal f o f 
these represen t bloc k sale s t o strategi c partners . However , Tur k Te leko m i s on e o f th e 
largest an d mos t valuabl e companie s i n th e block , alon g wit h Cab leco m o f Switzer lan d 
and Soner a o f Finlan d (se e Tab le-13) . 
Table -13: Selecte d Pendin g Bloc k Sale s i n Europ e an d CI S 
Company Country Region % Offere d Value ($bn ) 
Sonera Finland W. Europ e 53 15,000 
Cablecom Switzerland W.Europe 100 3,700 
Turk Teleko m Turkey W.Europe 20 2,000 
BulgarianTelecom Bulgaria E.Europe 51 600 
Ceske Radiokomunikac e Czech Republi c E.Europe 51 600 
E B C Estonia E.Europe 49 5.2 
Antenna Hungari a Hungary E.Europe 36 n/a 
Makedonski Teleko m Macedonia E.Europe 51 n/a 
Montenegro Teleco m Montenegro E.Europe n/a n/a 
R C S Romania E.Europe 20 30 
Sakekectrivacshiri Georgia CIS 75 n/a 
Saktelecom Georgia CIS 51 n/a 
Kazaktelecom Kazakhstan CIS 30 100 
Kyrgyztelecom Kyrgyztan CIS 40 n/a 
Moldova Teleco m Moldova CIS 51 n/a 
Urktelekom Ukraine CIS 25 548 
Source: Privatisatio n Internationa l Electronic. 
2 6 P I various issue s i n 200 0 an d PI Electronic Telecom Pipeline . 
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It i s n o coincidenc e tha t Tur k Te leko m privatizatio n stil l di d no t material iz e a s o f firs t 
half o f 200 1 despit e th e fac t tha t initia l step s wer e take n a s earl y a s i n 1994 . First , a n 
inadequate lega l f ramewor k hampere d privatizatio n efforts , whic h finall y wa s resolve d i n 
January 200 0 wit h th e introductio n o f ne w Telecommunicat ion s La w 4161 . However , thi s 
legal f ramewor k coul d onl y respon d t o object ive s se t i n referenc e t o marke t condit ion s 
of 1994-1995 . Second , governanc e ris k s temmin g fro m minorit y ownershi p stak e 
al lowed fo r strategi c partne r prove d t o b e particularl y unattractiv e unde r th e marke t 
condit ions i n th e las t quarte r o f 200 0 an d firs t quarte r o f 2001 . A  sever e f inancia l 
market downtur n i n globa l te lecommunicat ions , an d larg e numbe r o f privatizatio n 
pipeline create d a  ver y selectiv e investo r posture , an d reduce d th e wi l l ingnes s o f 
mult inational te lecommunicat ion s operator ' s appeti t e fo r participatio n i n join t venture s 
and consort i a fo r Tur k Te leko m offer ing . A  thir d an d equal l y importan t facto r i s th e 
uncertainty associate d wit h regulator y polic y i n th e Turk is h sett ing . A l though , 
privatization effort s neve r advance d s o fa r t o brin g u p regulator y ris k t o th e forefron t o f 
d iscussions, i n ou r opinio n thi s i s likel y t o b e a n issu e onc e othe r lega l an d strategi c 
design hurdle s sorte d out . Announcemen t o f a  clea r t imetabl e fo r compet i t iv e servic e 
provision woul d b e a n importan t initia l ste p toward s addressin g futur e regulator y issues . 
Our concern s an d suggest ion s regardin g regulator y f ramewor k wer e addresse d i n 
section fiv e o f th e paper . T h e sectio n fiv e provide s a  genera l backgroun d i n 
te lecommunicat ions regulat io n an d addresse s issue s pert inen t t o th e Turk is h case . 
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5 .  The Ne w Regulator y Framewor k 
5.1 W h y Regulat ion ? Argument s fo r Regulat io n o f th e Turkis h 
Te lecommunicat ions Marke t 
A brie f an d straightforwar d answe r t o th e quest io n o f " W h y regulat ion? " i s the existenc e 
of marke t fai lure s i n a  privatize d publi c utilit y sec to r 2 7 . Pr ivat izat io n o f a  stat e monopol y 
does no t automatical l y lea d t o a  compet i t iv e marke t structure . I t need s to b e a n integra l 
part o f a n overal l privatizatio n pla n fo r publi c utilities . 
In th e absenc e o f a  subsequen t regulat ion , a  privatize d monopol y wil l b e a s detr imenta l 
as it s predecessor . The majo r goa l o f a  privatizatio n strateg y fo r utilitie s i s to establ is h a 
funct ioning compet i t iv e marke t no t t o t ransfor m a  stat e monopol y int o a  privat e one . A n 
effective regulator y regim e i s essentia l an d instrumenta l i n achievin g a  compet i t iv e 
envi ronment i n th e industry . Ther e wil l b e numerou s issue s t o addres s b y a  regulator y 
reg ime, a t leas t unti l compet i t io n i n thos e market s i s estab l ished , an d n o nee d fo r 
regulat ion i s real ized . Wha t ar e thos e issue s i n a  regulate d te lecommunicat ion s market ? 
Even afte r a  wav e o f restructurin g an d divest i tures , mos t networ k industrie s stil l carr y 
some natura l monopol y character ist ics , an d thes e condit ion s nee d t o b e addresse d t o 
protect consumers . Th e vertica l brea k u p o f te lecommunicat ion s giant s doe s no t 
consti tute th e fina l stag e i n establ ishin g compet i t iv e markets . I n te lecommunicat ion s 
serv ices, eve n afte r separat in g loca l exchang e networ k operat ion s fro m it s long-distanc e 
service component , interconnect io n o f long-distanc e carr ier s t o a  monopol ist i c loca l 
exchange need s t o b e regulate d t o secur e a  fai r an d equa l access . Th e long-distanc e 
affil iate (o r subsidiary ) o f a  loca l exchang e operato r migh t stil l ge t preferentia l t reatmen t 
and acces s ma y b e restricte d t o others . Thes e potentia l constraint s woul d no t b e 
compat ib le wit h compet i t iv e industr y performance . 
The issu e o f interconnect ion s wil l b e a t th e hear t o f te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n i f th e 
reform cont inue s i n th e af termat h o f privatization . Absen t a  preceden t fo r " ru le s o f th e 
g a m e , " establ ishin g a  compet i t iv e env i ronmen t wit h t ransparen t rule s wil l b e a  majo r 
task fo r Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s regulators . Withou t thes e rules , eve n unde r privat e 
ownersh ip , th e te lecommunicat ion s marke t ma y tur n int o a  " jung le " wit h substantia l 
ren ts . 2 8 
Also , servic e qual i t y mus t b e monitore d t o protec t capt iv e customer s i n loca l exchang e 
territories. Protect io n o f consumer s i n a  pos t privatizatio n env i ronmen t i s on e o f th e 
major dut ie s o f th e regulator . 
Th is bein g sa id , regulat io n ca n potential l y b e use d t o creat e protecte d marke t segments . 
Regulatory captur e i s stil l a  threa t eve n i n advance d market s an d th e au tonom y o f th e 
regulator i s a  must . Regulator y tiltin g towar d certai n provider s wil l no t onl y har m marke t 
2 7 Fo r that matte r simila r marke t failure s als o exis t i n a  state ru n publi c utilit y market . Sinc e these market s ar e no t subjec t 
to publi c regulation , the distortionar y effect s o f thos e marke t failure s wil l stil l b e widespread. 
2 8 Currentl y there ar e around fiv e hundre d long-distanc e companies (of whic h fou r o f the m majo r carriers ) i n the U.S . 
operating i n differen t state s an d the succes s o f thi s marke t outcom e i s overwhelmingly du e to well-establishe d fair an d 
transparent rule s regardin g interconnections . 
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eff iciency, bu t i t wil l a ls o creat e futur e credibil i t y problem s fo r th e regulato r itself . Th e 
au tonomy o f th e regulato r wil l a ls o serv e i n shieldin g th e agenc y fro m governmen t 
pressure. 
Of course , regulat io n come s with it s cost . Ther e i s a  whol e literatur e o n welfar e cost s o f 
regulat ion eithe r throug h creat io n o f implementat io n lag s o r direc t cost s impose d o n th e 
industry. However , w e shoul d kee p i n min d tha t sinc e ful l compet i t io n i n thes e industrie s 
is no t feasibl e ye t w e ough t t o b e contendin g wit h a  second-bes t solut ion . Th i s o f cours e 
does no t mea n tha t regulato r mus t no t b e hel d accountable . Transparenc y an d efficien t 
regulat ion ca n minimiz e th e cos t o f regulat ion . Per formanc e base d ( incentive ) 
mechan isms ar e effectiv e tool s i n progressin g towar d a  full y compet i t iv e marke t 
structure an d gradual l y minimizin g th e rol e o f regulat ion . W e wil l explor e th e concep t o f 
opt imal regulat io n i n sectio n 5.2 . 
Whi le assert in g th e importanc e o f it , regulat io n o f a  te lecommunicat ion s marke t shoul d 
not b e though t a s th e ult imat e target . I t i s onl y a  mean s t o achiev e th e efficien t 
work ings o f a  networ k industry , wher e marke t fai lure s exis t du e t o th e ver y natur e o f 
the industry . Unti l market s ca n wor k i n a  sel f-sustaine d compet i t iv e fash ion , a  functiona l 
public regulat io n ca n protec t consume r interest s an d promot e eff icienc y i n th e industry . 
The Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s marke t ca n benefi t f ro m th e regulator y exper ienc e o f 
var ious wester n economies . Unti l a  decad e ago , th e U.S . te lecommunicat ion s marke t 
was subjecte d t o heav y publi c regulat ion . A t th e presen t t ime , advance s bot h i n theor y 
and practic e o f networ k servic e provisio n hav e al lowe d industrie s t o b e regulate d i n a 
much mor e minima l manner . Min imu m regulat io n withou t causin g extraordinar y 
regulatory lag s result s i n eff icienc y gains . Th i s exper ienc e o f th e wester n market s ca n 
help th e Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s industr y an d it s regulato r t o star t a t a  highe r poin t 
on it s learnin g curve . 
There i s n o singl e homogenou s regulator y manua l tha t i s appl icabl e acros s al l borders . 
Regulat ion need s t o b e custo m mad e fo r eac h marke t an d it s institutiona l endowment . 
Kessides (1998 ) note s tha t "...i f th e regulator y syste m i s incompatibl e wit h th e country ' s 
institutional endowment , privatizatio n ma y lea d t o disappoint in g results , recr iminat ion , 
and call s fo r renat ional izat ion. " 2 9 Th e succes s o f a  privatizatio n pla n i s int imatel y 
related t o th e regulator y desig n fol lowin g sale . However , i f polic y maker s se e regulat io n 
as anothe r too l fo r imposin g centra l contro l ove r th e industry , th e cur e migh t wel l b e 
worse tha n th e disease . 
Regulat ion, i n som e instances , causes inefficiencie s i n th e market s b y givin g unintende d 
incentives t o th e f i rm . Fo r decades , rat e o f retur n regulat io n (ROR ) ha s bee n 
implemented i n th e U. S te lecommunicat ion s market . Wel l researche d Averch-Johnso n 
(A-J) effec t o f R O R regulat io n whic h indicate d that , whe n th e rat e bas e i s capita l an d 
f irms ear n retur n a s a  percentag e o f thei r capita l investment , overcapital izat io n ( i .e. , 
excess capita l investment ) ca n result . Lackin g a n incentiv e mechanis m fo r eff icienc y 
improvements fo r th e f i rm , R O R regulat ion i s bein g abandone d i n man y jur isdict ion s i n 
the U.S.A . a t a n increasin g speed . Subsequen t pr ice-ca p regulat io n i s a  pricin g schem e 
2 9 Kessides , ibid. , p . 104 . 
31 
to remed y sid e effect s o f R O R regulat ion. W e wil l revie w majo r regulator y method s an d 
make polic y recommendat ion s i n subsequen t sect ions . 
5.2. Argument s fo r Opt ima l Regulat io n 
The majo r goa l o f regulat io n i s t o establ is h incentive s fo r f i rm s i n a  noncompet i t iv e 
market t o achiev e efficien t an d social l y desirabl e outcomes . 3 0 However , thes e outcome s 
are general l y expecte d o f compet i t iv e markets . Ho w ca n th e regulato r induc e th e sol e 
suppl ier i n a  marke t t o produc e efficien t an d social l y desirabl e outcome s tha t ca n onl y 
be associate d wit h compet i t iv e markets ? Specif ical ly , wha t i s th e opt ima l outcom e i n a 
regulated monopol y market ? 
A perfectl y compet i t iv e solutio n mandate s margina l cos t (MC ) pricin g s o tha t tota l 
surplus i s maximized . I n fact , thi s a s goo d a s i t gets . Efficien t an d social l y desirabl e ( i .e. , 
opt imal) ou tcom e i s realize d whe n P = M C . Ca n thi s sam e principl e character iz e a 
regulated monopo ly ? Th e regulato r canno t se t P = M C wher e th e monopol is t i n networ k 
industries incur s heav y upfron t f ixe d costs . Ignorin g thes e cost s an d sett in g P = M C wil l 
not le t th e fir m brea k even . Decl inin g L R A C ove r th e relevan t marke t deman d segmen t 
points t o th e existenc e o f economie s o f scal e and /o r economie s o f scope . I n fact , thi s i s 
the " reaso n d 'et re " o f natura l monopoly . Decl inin g LRA C indicate s tha t th e M C wil l li e 
below th e A C . Sett in g monopol ist ' s pric e a t M C wil l resul t i n losses . S o , th e f irst-bes t 
solution i s ou t i n thi s case . 
Providing monopol is t onl y wit h norma l profi t an d lettin g fir m t o brea k eve n i s possibl e 
under A C pricing . A t A C , price wil l b e highe r an d outpu t wil l b e lowe r compare d t o th e 
f irst-best solut ion . Tota l surplu s i s maximize d unde r th e constrain t o f zer o economi c 
profit. T h e concep t o f second-bes t solut io n i s du e t o thi s constraine d maximizat ion . 
Economic theor y indicate s tha t th e monopol is t als o minimize s it s cost s whi l e maximiz in g 
its profit s ( i .e. , MR=MC) . Bu t whe n i t i s lef t unregulated , pric e exceed s MC . T h u s , th e 
opt imal outcom e i n a  regulate d marke t depend s o n th e pricin g mechan ism . I n a  singl e 
output case , th e solutio n i s straightforwar d fo r a n unsubsidize d monopol ist . Th e 
regulator ca n requir e monopol is t t o se t P=AC . 
In mult i-outpu t cases , wher e economie s o f scal e an d scop e dictat e monopol is t t o 
produce mor e tha n on e g o o d , th e pricin g schem e coul d b e compl icated . Var iou s 
combinat ions o f M C and A C pricin g fo r differen t product s and /o r service s can enabl e fir m 
to brea k even . A  hos t o f studie s sugges t that , welfar e maximiz in g (opt imal ) pricin g i n 
this contex t i s equivalen t o f Ramse y Pr ic ing , whic h i s als o know n a s invers e elasticit y 
ru le . 3 1 
Ramsey Pricin g maximize s tota l surplu s (o r minimize s los s compare d t o f irst-bes t 
outcome) b y chargin g highe r price s wher e deman d i s les s elastic . Th i s ma y brin g som e 
3 0 Efficienc y (i.e. , productiv e efficiency ) occur s whe n a  perfectl y competitiv e fir m produce s a t th e minimu m poin t o f it s 
long-run averag e cos t (LRAC ) curve . Sociall y desirable outcome i s achieved when allocativ e efficienc y i s obtained b y 
producing a t M C so tha t tota l (social ) surplu s i s maximized. 
3 1 Invers e elasticit y rul e ca n also be applie d i n single-outpu t cas e wher e multipar t tariff s ar e designe d to charg e lowe r 
prices a s consumption goe s up . 
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equity an d fairnes s quest ions . Shoul d a  necessit y b e charge d highe r price s wher e 
consumers lac k opt ions ? T h e concep t o f optimali t y mus t b e reassesse d her e wher e 
opt imal pricin g i n technica l sens e appear s t o b e i n confl ic t wit h social l y equitabl e 
policies. I n othe r words , a s K . Tra i n asser ts , " [T]he regulato r mus t addres s these equit y 
issues i n decidin g whethe r t o implemen t (or , mor e precisely , induc e th e fir m t o 
implement) Ramse y pr ices. " 3 2 
A majo r obstacl e i n obtainin g opt ima l ou tcom e i s th e informationa l asymmetr y betwee n 
the fir m (agent ) an d th e regulato r (principle) . Th e regulate d fir m possesse s th e 
information abou t it s t ru e cos t an d deman d parameter s bu t th e regulato r doesn't . Th e 
firm ha s a n incentiv e t o hid e o r misrepor t ( i .e. , inflate ) it s cost s to increas e profits . Som e 
models a i m t o overcom e thi s obstacl e b y developin g regulator y mechan ism s tha t induc e 
f irms t o mov e t o opt ima l p r i ces . 3 3 Othe r model s a i m a t designin g mor e specif i c tarif f 
mechan isms suc h a s mult ipar t tariff s o r t im e o f us e pricin g schemes . The y al l targe t 
maximiz ing surplu s b y applyin g secto r specif i c pricin g algor i thms . Mult ipar t tariff s includ e 
fixed acces s charge s an d usag e charge s tha t ar e proport iona l t o consump t i on . 3 4 Unde r 
certain mechanism s usag e charge s ca n b e designe d i n for m o f bloc k rate s wher e 
charges ma y increase/decreas e as consumpt io n varies . Decl inin g o r inverte d bloc k rat e 
design ha s substantia l welfar e enhancin g implicat ion s an d ha s broa d base d 
implementat ion i n utilities . Aga in , the searc h fo r opt ima l numbe r o f block s an d th e for m 
of bloc k rate s wil l reflec t equit y issues . T h e appl icat io n o f th e " r ight " tarif f forma t rest s 
with th e regulator . 
T ime o f us e pr ic ing , o n th e othe r hand , a im s t o creat e opt ima l pricin g mechanis m wher e 
capaci ty i s f ixe d an d networ k congest ion s occur . Unde r thi s scheme , utilitie s a i m t o 
ration thei r avai labl e capaci t y i n respons e t o f luctuatin g deman d an d preven t blackout s 
or shutdowns . Designin g suc h a  rat e mechanis m prevent s utilitie s fro m investin g i n 
excess capaci ty , minimiz e cos t an d holdin g capaci t y c lose r to opt imal . 
A l though th e regulator y desig n model s w e hav e reviewe d wer e (being ) appl ie d acros s 
industries t o certai n extent , rea l worl d regulator y incentive  mechanism s ar e conf ine d t o 
the fol lowin g tw o majo r model s o f regulat ion : rat e o f retur n regulat io n an d pric e ca p 
regulat ion (o r a  hybri d o f th e two) . 
In th e U.S . an d U.K . thes e method s ar e use d extensivel y fo r electr ic , natura l gas , wate r 
and te lecommunicat ion s sectors . Eac h metho d provide d vas t resource s fo r academi c 
work ove r th e las t fou r decade s an d relate d researc h produce d result s pointin g t o cost s 
and benefit s o f thes e methods . 
R O R regulat ion , especial l y afte r Averch-Johnson ' s semina l wor k i n th e earl y 1960s , 
attracted mor e attentio n an d provide d th e backgroun d fo r subsequen t research . Mos t o f 
the wor k pointe d t o th e inefficiencie s associate d b y thi s metho d afte r year s o f 
3 2 K . E . Train (1991) , Optimal  Regulation,  MI T Press , pp . 116-117 . 
3 3 "Vogelsang-Finsenger " mechanism (i n Ing o Vogelsan g and Jor g Finsinge r (1979) , "Regulator y Adjustmen t Proces s fo r 
Optimal Pricin g by Multiproduc t Monopol y Firms, " Bell Journal  of  Economics,  present s suc h a  schem e where eve n thoug h 
such asymmetrie s exist , regulate d fir m move s ove r tim e t o Ramse y Prices . 
3 4 Optimall y se t fixe d acces s charge s allo w utilitie s t o implemen t M C pricing fo r usage . 
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appl icat ion an d regulator s al l ove r th e spectru m now , ar e movin g awa y fro m R O R t o 
performance base d regulat io n (PBR ) or pric e caps . 
Pr ice ca p regulat io n gaine d momentu m ove r t im e mainl y becaus e o f it s eff icienc y 
implicat ions. I n th e fol lowin g tw o sect ions , w e wil l g o int o detai l s o f thes e tw o method s 
and stat e thei r basi c implications . Final ly , w e wil l conclud e tha t th e pric e ca p metho d i s 
a bette r candidat e fo r eff icienc y purpose s an d Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s regulator s 
are advise d t o conside r prio r exper ienc e o f thei r wester n counterparts . 
5.3. Majo r Regulator y Mechanism s fo r Utilities : A Surve y 
5.3.1 Rat e of Retur n Regulatio n 
From it s ear l y year s o n , th e regulator s o f publi c utilitie s i n th e U.S . an d U.K . use d R O R 
regu la t ion . 3 5 Fol lowin g Averch-Johnson ' s wor k i n 1 9 6 2 , 3 6 whic h modele d thi s method , 
the issu e attracte d considerabl e theoretica l a s wel l a s empir ica l at tent ion . Th e mode l 
abstracts fro m man y rea l worl d aspect s o f R O R regulat io n however , it s result s hel p 
assess importan t issues . Th e mode l conc lude s tha t R O R regulat ion , b y givin g pervers e 
incent ives, ha s lea d t o inefficien t (su b opt imal ) capi ta l - labor(K/L ) ratio s i n publi c utilitie s 
in favo r o f capital . Th i s ha s resulte d i n highe r cost s an d lowe r outpu t level s tha n 
regulat ion i n tended . 3 7 
Let u s briefl y explor e th e mode l an d sat e it s impl icat ions : 
In publi c utilitie s regulat ion , rat e case s ar e pursue d o n th e basi s o f a  concep t calle d 
Revenue Requiremen t (RR) . R R can b e writ te n as : 
Where , 
O C = Al lowabl e operat in g cost s fo r noncapita l i npu ts 3 8 
K= Capita l 
f= Al lowabl e (fair ) rat e o f retur n 
Here w e cal l K  a s a  (rate ) bas e inpu t an d R O R will b e calculate d o n th e basi s o f K . T h e 
regulator set s the rul e tha t th e fir m ca n ear n a  R O R no large r tha n f . Tha t is , 
( i .e., ne t revenue s pe r bas e unit ) 
3 5 Thi s i s also called "cost-based" regulation since , unde r thi s metho d th e regulate d fir m i s allowed t o recove r al l 
"reasonable" costs i t incurs . 
3 6 H . Averch and L . Johnson (1962) , "Behavio r o f th e Fir m Unde r Regulator y Constraint, " American Economic  Review,  Vol . 
52. 
3 7 Anothe r deficienc y o f thi s metho d i s the lac k o f a n incentiv e mechanism , which encourage s firm t o b e mor e efficient . 
3 8 I n rea l worl d situatio n regulato r ha s some oversigh t contro l ove r th e firm' s choice s of inputs . However , th e A- J mode l 
assumes tha t th e fir m i s free t o choos e its level s of inputs , it s outpu t level , an d it s pric e leve l a s lon g a s the fir m earn s n o 
more tha n th e allowe d rat e o f return . Trai n assert s that th e result s o f thi s mode l ca n b e expecte d t o hol d t o a  degre e 
when th e regulato r ha s les s tha n perfectl y effectiv e oversigh t abilit y (Train , ibid. , p . 33) . 
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and 
Assuming onl y on e noncapita l (no n rat e base ) input , th e fir m a im s t o maximiz e profits ; 
Max n= RR(L,K ) - w L - r K subjec t t o th e R R constrain t 
The result in g f irst-orde r condit ion s o f thi s maximizat io n y i e l d 3 9 
Thus , th e fir m act s a s i f th e cos t o f capita l i s cheape r tha n i t actual l y is . Th i s result s i n 
the regulate d fir m usin g to o muc h capita l compare d t o th e leas t cos t combinat ion . I n 
other words , th e K/ L rati o o f th e regulate d fir m i s inefficientl y hig h fo r a  give n leve l o f 
output. Th i s bia s i s actual l y cal le d th e " A - J ef fect" o f R O R regulat ion. I t indicate s tha t 
the regulate d fir m ca n increas e it s profits , i n absolut e te rms , b y expandin g it s capita l 
base. Thus , i t overuse s capital . 4 0 
A fir m unde r R O R regulat io n build s extr a capaci t y unde r th e pretex t o f pea k shavin g 
facil i ty, providin g relie f i n pea k t im e us e o r reliability . 
A l though theoret ica l result s indicat e thi s wa y empir ica l result s ar e mixed . On e argumen t 
in favo r o f R O R regulat io n i s tha t capita l deepenin g i s synonymou s wit h technologica l 
innovation an d observe d advance s in te lecommunicat ion s i s a  resul t o f thi s policy . 
5.3.2. Pric e Cap s 
Price cap s (PC) , one o f th e performanc e base d regulator y tools , wer e firs t implemente d 
in th e U.S . long-distanc e te lephon e marke t an d th e privatize d U.K . te lephone , natura l 
gas , electri c an d wate r industries . I n th e U.K. , pric e cap s hav e bee n use d primari l y i n 
efforts designe d t o secur e eff icienc y improvement s i n th e privatize d publi c utilit y 
companies. 
Price cap s ar e des igned , o r targeted , t o provid e f irm s a n incentiv e t o improv e thei r 
product ive eff icienc y whil e cappin g pric e increase s at a  predetermine d leve l fo r a  perio d 
of t ime . I n thi s s i tuat ion , th e regulator y pricin g schem e limit s th e fir m t o charg e a  pric e 
at o r belo w th e ca p fo r th e revie w per iod , an d th e fir m ca n kee p surpluse s tha t ma y 
accrue du e t o potentia l eff icienc y improvements . T h e fundamenta l formul a fo r a  P C is: 
3 9 Se e Appendix A fo r derivatio n o f thi s result . 
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where 
L= noncapita l inpu t 
r= cos t o f capita l 
w= cos t o f noncapita l inpu t 
RPI -  X 
where RP I indicate s th e rat e o f th e f irm' s assume d pric e increas e (ofte n expresse d i n 
ei ther consume r pric e index , CP I o r produce r pric e index , PP I terms ) an d X  i s th e 
expected increas e i n th e leve l o f productivi t y (o r reductio n i n costs) . 
If, fo r examp le , th e regulator y agenc y set s RP I =  PP I to reflec t inpu t pric e increases , a n 
increase o f 1 0 % i n th e inde x minu s a  3  %  expecte d productivit y increas e wil l mea n tha t 
the pric e chang e wil l b e cappe d a t 7  %  pe r year , throughou t th e revie w period . Th i s 
mechanism provide s a n incentiv e fo r th e selle r t o adop t eff icienc y improvement s s o tha t 
the compan y ca n retai n th e va lu e o f an y productivi t y ris e unti l th e company ' s nex t rat e 
review. I n thi s example , whe n actua l productivi t y increas e change s fro m 3  %  t o 5  % , 
the company ' s pric e ca p provide s a n addit iona l 2 % profi t t o th e fir m instea d o f lowe r 
author ized profi t tha t wa s implici t i n th e calculate d 7 % pric e cap . Now , th e pric e 
increase i s capped effectivel y a t 9 % instea d o f 7 % . 
A refine d P C formula ca n b e expresse d a s fol lows : 
P(t) is the company ' s weighte d averag e pric e (cap ) i n yea r (t ) 
P(t-1) is the company ' s weighte d averag e pric e i n yea r (t-1 ) 
RPI(t) i s a  pric e inflatio n inde x fo r yea r (t ) 
X is a  productivit y offse t tha t woul d remai n constan t throughou t th e revie w perio d 
Z(t) is a n adjustmen t fo r exogenou s cost s that migh t occu r i n yea r (t ) an d 
Q(t) is a n indicato r o f qual i t y o f servic e i n yea r (t) , takin g a  valu e o f zer o o r les s tha n 
zero , base d o n whethe r th e compan y meet s min imu m qual i t y o f servic e standard s 
Unintended regulator y lag s fo r rat e case s unde r R O R regulat ion ar e knowingl y buil t int o 
PC syste m s o tha t thes e lag s creat e opportuni t y fo r f i rm s t o improv e thei r product iv e 
eff iciency an d reduc e costs . 
When a  regulato r f ixe s th e ca p fo r th e revie w per iod , th e fir m wil l see k t o produc e a t 
cost minimizin g inpu t level s an d retai n al l profit s du e t o enhance d eff iciency . T h u s , P C 
regulat ion yield s improve d eff icienc y an d surplu s gain s compare d t o R O R regu la t ion . 4 1 
However , unles s th e previou s pricin g schem e resulte d i n highe r price s tha n th e on e 
without regulat ion , th e increase d (monetary ) surplu s accrue s entirely t o th e f i rm , leavin g 
consumers no t benefit in g fro m increase d product iv e ef f ic iency. 4 2 
S o , ho w ar e consumer s goin g t o benefi t f ro m P C regulat ion? T h e answe r t o thi s quest io n 
can b e foun d i n a  dynami c context . Unde r changin g deman d an d cos t condi t ions , pric e 
caps mus t chang e too . Periodi c review s o f th e cap s wil l ensur e tha t th e fir m wil l neithe r 
keep losin g mone y no r mak e larg e profits . A t th e en d o f eac h revie w perio d regulato r i s 
4 1 Not e tha t variabl e Q  i n th e formul a i s a n adde d incentiv e mechanis m fo r wha t ca n b e calle d a s "qualitative" efficiency . 
4 2 Train , ibid. , p . 318 . 
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able t o lowe r th e ca p give n highe r tha n expecte d productivi t y i n th e formula . Th i s woul d 
provide downwar d tren d i n utilit y prices . A lso , initia l settin g o f X- facto r leve l ma y impl y 
addit ional benefit s fo r consumers . 
There coul d b e tw o reason s fo r a  ca p revie w b y th e regu la tor : 4 3 Change s i n inpu t cost s 
exogenous t o th e fir m an d a n increas e i n f irm' s positiv e profits , whic h i s endogenou s t o 
the f i rm . I n th e forme r case , th e regulato r ma y ti e th e ca p t o a n inpu t pric e index ; an d 
subsequent increase s i n thi s inde x ma y promp t th e revie w o f th e cap . Th i s cas e i s 
simple t o analyz e sinc e the fir m wil l no t chang e it s behavio r an d cont inu e t o minimiz e it s 
costs. 
However , whe n th e pric e ca p i s goin g t o b e change d o n th e basi s of f ir m earnin g exces s 
posit ive profits , the n th e issu e o f ca p revie w mus t tak e int o considerat io n th e strategi c 
behavior o f th e f i rm . Strategi c behavio r o f th e fir m wil l b e forme d o n th e basi s o f th e 
f irm's expectat ion s abou t th e regulator ' s act ions . I f th e regulato r announce s tha t i t wil l 
switch fro m R O R regulat ion t o P C regulat ion, the n th e fir m ma y engag e i n wast in g mor e 
prior t o switchin g i n orde r t o kee p th e effectiv e ca p higher . It s profit s i n th e fol lowin g 
period unde r P C regulat ion wil l b e higher . 
If revie w i s planne d whi l e P C regulat ion i s i n p lace , then th e fol lowin g strategi c behavio r 
of th e fir m ca n b e observed : T h e regulato r ma y fol lo w a  rul e tha t profit s ar e assesse d 
based o n th e firm' s profit s durin g th e mos t recen t year . T h e n , the fir m minimize s cos t i n 
other period s bu t inflat e cost s i n th e las t yea r t o receiv e a  highe r cap . A  highe r ca p 
would mea n highe r profit s i n th e fol lowin g y e a r s . 4 4 
This behavio r lead s t o th e fol lowin g conclus ion : A s lon g a s th e regulato r set s mor e 
frequent reviews , th e wastefu l behavio r o f th e fir m unde r R O R will b e mimicke d unde r 
PC regulat ion . T h e les s frequen t review s wil l creat e roo m fo r th e fir m t o creat e surplu s 
through increase d efficiency . Eve n i n thi s s i tuat ion , th e fir m migh t engag e i n strategi c 
behavior. T h e n , th e regulato r mus t com e u p wit h a  metho d o f thes e review s s o a s t o 
minimize sub-opt ima l behavior . 
5.4. U.S . Exper ienc e i n Te lecommunicat ion s Regulat ion : A n Assessmen t o f 
O u t c o m e s 
5.4.1. Historica l Backgroun d 
Historical deve lopmen t o f U.S . te lecommunicat ion s market s offer s valuabl e lesson s no t 
only fo r Turk is h market s bu t als o fo r th e res t o f th e wor ld . Withi n thi s lin e o f 
development on e observe s t ransformat io n o f a  regulate d natura l monopol y marke t int o 
a lmost complete l y deregulate d long-distanc e te lephon e markets . 
43 Ibid. , pp . 325-328 . 
4 4 Trai n state s that "  [u]nles s th e firm' s discoun t rat e i s very high , the presen t valu e o f curren t an d futur e profit s wil l b e 
higher i f the fir m waste s i n the yea r befor e a  review " (Ibid. , pp . 327-328) . 
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A s earl y a s lat e 1940s , th e U.S . te lecommunicat ion s industr y starte d t o fac e chal lenge s 
with respec t t o it s natura l monopol y s ta tus . 4 5 Prio r t o Wor l d Wa r II , bot h ope n wir e an d 
Amer ican Te lephon e an d Te legrap h Company ' s (AT&T ) subsequen t inventio n o f coaxia l 
cable (highe r capaci t y t ransmission ) technologie s require d physica l connect io n o f wi res , 
which asserte d th e scal e economie s aspec t o f a  natura l monopoly . Highe r f ixe d cost s o f 
installation o f t ransmissio n line s ensure d a  natura l monopol y statu s eve n fo r th e larges t 
long-distance routes . Fol lowin g th e en d o f Wor l d W a r II , a  commercia l l y feasibl e us e o f 
microwave t ransmissio n throug h a  serie s o f microwav e rela y stat ion s great l y reduce d 
the siz e o f th e necessar y f ixe d cost s an d min imu m efficien t f ir m siz e i n th e industry . 
Together wit h increasin g deman d fo r te lecommunicat ion s serv ices , var iou s f irm s an d 
government organizat ion s bega n petit ionin g th e Federa l Communicat ion s Commiss io n 
(FCC) i n th e earl y 1950 s t o ente r th e point-to-poin t communicat ion s market . 
Microwave Communicat ion s Inc.' s (MCI ) 196 3 petit ionin g o f th e FC C to al lo w the m t o 
enter th e St . Louis-Chicag o privat e lin e syste m ( P L S ) 4 6 fo r th e long-distanc e marke t 
resulted i n approva l i n 1969 . Fol lowin g thi s dec is ion , the FC C al lowed fre e entr y t o th e 
PLS marke t i n 1971 . 
In 1975 , th e FC C al lowe d MC I t o serv e i n th e intercit y ( long-distance ) markets . 
However , compet i t io n i n long-distanc e market s effectivel y starte d i n 197 8 fol lowin g a 
court overrul in g o f a n earl ie r FC C decis ion . 
Until 1978 , A T & T wa s th e sol e provide r o f loca l exchang e an d long-distanc e te lephon e 
services an d th e FC C regulated it s rates . Fol lowin g th e introductio n o f compet i t io n int o 
the long-distanc e markets , th e FC C cont inued t o regulat e long-distanc e providers , A T & T 
in part icular , t o preven t i t fro m exercisin g marke t power . A  majo r potentia l threa t see n 
by th e FC C was th e cross-subsidizat io n o f compet i t iv e service s b y A T & T a t th e expens e 
of monopol y ( i .e. , loca l te lephone ) services . 
A landmar k seven-yea r antitrus t cas e agains t A T & T b y th e Just ic e Departmen t wa s 
concluded i n Januar y 1982 , divest in g A T & T int o seve n so-cal le d "bab y bel ls " (Regiona l 
Bell Operat in g Compan ies , o r RBOCs) . B y thi s dec is ion , A T &T agree d t o separat e itsel f 
f rom it s twenty- tw o te lephon e operat in g companies . Loca l operat ion s wer e subdivide d 
into 16 1 " loca l exchang e an d transpor t a reas " (LATAs) with eac h LAT A bein g assigne d t o 
one o f th e RBOCs . A  majo r restrictio n fo r th e ne w RBOC s wa s tha t the y wer e no t 
al lowed t o provid e interLAT A services . A s a  resul t o f fina l brea k u p i n 1984 , A T & T wa s 
al lowed t o kee p Wester n Electri c ( te lecommunicat ion s equipmen t manufactur in g 
div is ion), Bel l Lab s (it s researc h an d developmen t division ) an d Lon g Line s (whic h 
served i n long-distanc e markets) . 
Since then , A T & T ha s bee n operat in g i n long-distanc e market s togethe r wit h tw o majo r 
carriers (MC I an d Sprint ) an d man y othe r smal le r compan ies . 4 7 
4 5 Th e followin g historica l backgroun d mainl y follow s W . Ki p Viscusi , Joh n M. Verno n an d Josep h E. Harrington , Jr . (1997) , 
Economics of  Regulation  and  Antitrust,  Th e MI T Press , (ch . 15) . 
4 6 Th e PL S syste m connect s two o r mor e point s t o mee t th e communicatio n need s o f a  specifi c larg e size d customers 
being eithe r a  firm o r a  governmen t agency . 
4 7 Hundred s o f teleco m companie s are currentl y providin g long-distanc e service s in the U.S . mainly b y leasin g excess lines 
from majo r long-distanc e carriers . Followin g competitiv e trend s i n loca l exchang e service provision , AT&T ha s recentl y 
started t o provid e loca l loo p service s throughout th e U.S . 
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5.4.2. Regulator y Exper ienc e 
5.4.2.1 Long-Dis tanc e Market s 
Al though, curren t te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n i n Nort h Amer ic a i s a t it s min imu m 
level , stat e Publi c Utilit y Commiss ion s ar e stil l regulatin g intrastat e interLAT A services . 
At th e federa l level , onl y A T & T ha s bee n subjec t t o pric e regulat io n b y th e FC C unti l 
1995, mainl y becaus e o f precaut ionar y mot ive s agains t it s potentia l marke t power . 
AT&T 's larg e marke t shar e ha s bee n a  powerfu l facto r i n thi s t reatment . Sinc e 1995 , n o 
long-distance operato r ha s bee n subjec t t o pric e regulat io n a t th e nationa l level . Tab les -
14 an d 1 5 sho w hig h marke t shar e o f A T & T i n th e market . 
Table-14:Market Shar e o f P r e s u b s c r i b e d 4 8 Line s i n Long-Distanc e 
Te lephone Market s (% ) 
AT&T MCI Sprint Worldcom Other 
1987 83.7 8.2 4.8 3.3 
1988 80.6 9.8 5.8 3.9 
1989 77.4 11.7 6.4 0.1 4.5 
1990 75.6 13.2 6.6 0.1 4.6 
1991 75 13.5 6.2 0.2 5 
1992 73 14.5 6.4 0.3 5.8 
1993 71.2 15.3 6.5 1.2 5.8 
1994 70 14.8 6.4 1.3 7.4 
1995 66.4 15.7 6.4 2.7 8.8 
1996 63.3 14.5 7.4 2.7 12.1 
Source: Lon g Distanc e Marke t Share s Fourt h Quarte r 1998 , Industr y Analysis Division , Common Carrie r 
Bureau, FC C March 1999 . 
4 8 Note : A  telephon e lin e i s said to b e presubscribe d t o th e long-distanc e carrie r tha t receive s the ordinar y long-distanc e 
calls place d o n tha t line . I n area s where equa l acces s is available (area s no w coverin g mor e tha n 9 9 % o f th e U.S . lines) , 
customers ma y choos e a  long-distanc e carrier . I n area s wher e equa l acces s is no t ye t available , al l line s ar e considere d 
presubscribed t o AT&T . A s of Decembe r 1996 , 158. 7 millio n presubscribe d line s exis t i n the Unite d States . 
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Table -15: Marke t Shar e Base d o n Operat in g Revenue s o f Lon g Distanc e 
Carriers (% ) 
AT&T MCI Sprint Wordcom Othe r HH-Index* 
1984 90.1 4.5 2.7 2.6 8155 
1985 86.3 5.5 2.6 5.6 7479 
1986 81.9 7.6 4.3 6.3 6783 
1987 78.6 8.8 5.8 6.8 6298 
1988 74.6 10.3 7.2 8.0 5720 
1989 67.5 12.1 8.4 0.2 11. 8 4778 
1990 65.0 14.2 9.7 0.3 10. 8 4527 
1991 63.2 15.2 9.9 0.5 11. 3 4321 
1992 60.8 16.7 9.7 1.4 11. 5 4074 
1993 58.1 17.8 10.0 1.9 12. 3 3795 
1994 55.2 17.4 10.1 3.3 14. 0 3466 
1995 51.8 19.7 9.8 4.9 13. 8 3197 
1996 47.9 20.0 9.7 5.5 17. 0 2823 
1997 44.5 19.4 9.7 6.7 19. 8 2508 
Source: FC C (March 1999) . *  Herfindahl-Hirshma n Inde x 
Table 16 : Marke t Share s i n Internationa l Servic e (% ) 
AT&T MCI Sprint Wordco m Other 
1984 100 
1985 97.3 2.2 0.5 
1986 93.3 4.9 1.7 
1987 90.7 6.4 2.7 0.2 
1988 87.1 8.9 3.8 0.2 
1989 82.5 11.5 5.6 0.4 
1990 79.1 14.6 5.8 0.5 
1991 73 16.3 7.3 0. 1 3.4 
1992 68.4 19.8 7.9 0. 4 3.5 
1993 62.6 23.6 9 0. 8 4 
1994 59.7 22.5 9.6 1. 9 6.3 
1995 53.5 25.5 8.6 3 9.3 
1996 48.3 20.3 8.9 4. 4 18.1 
1997 43.5 22.2 8.1 4. 1 22.1 
Source: FC C (March 1999) . 
On th e othe r hand , sam e dat a indicat e decl inin g marke t shar e o f A T & T ove r th e year s 
fol lowing th e introductio n o f compet i t io n i n th e long-distanc e market . Whi l e AT&T ' s 
market shar e o f 8 3 . 7 % i n 198 7 decl ine d t o 6 3 . 3 % i n 199 6 al l othe r remainin g carrier s 
increased thei r shar e i n th e marke t f ro m 1 6 . 3 % t o 3 6 . 7 % durin g th e sam e perio d (se e 
T a b l e - 1 4 ) . I n th e internationa l long-distanc e market , thi s deve lopmen t i s even mor e 
dramat ic (se e Tab le-16) . 
A lso , compet i t iv e t rend s i n th e industr y ca n b e see n fro m th e decl in e i n H i rshman -
Herf indahl Indice s (HHI ) est imate d b y th e FC C based o n long-distanc e carr ie r revenue . 
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HH inde x numbers , whic h measure s industr y concentrat io n resultin g fro m horizonta l 
mergers i n th e market , ha s fal le n t o 250 8 i n 199 7 fro m 815 5 i n 1984 . 4 9 
Throughout th e las t decade , another majo r developmen t wa s th e entr y o f man y 
incumbent loca l exchang e carrier s ( ILECs ) i n th e marke t a s compet i tors . T h e FCC 
reports tha t th e numbe r o f line s presubscr ibe d fo r long-distanc e servic e to ILEC s i n thei r 
own servic e areas ha s increase d approximately 40 0 percen t betwee n 198 9 an d 1996 , 
and th e numbe r o f servic e areas i n whic h ILEC s provid e interLAT A long-distanc e servic e 
has increase d over 1,00 0 percent , fo r th e sam e t ime pe r iod . 5 0 
In term s o f regulator y method , A T & T wa s subjec t t o R O R regulat io n unti l 198 9 an d 
thereby earne d al lowe d retur n o n it s investe d capital . R O R regulat io n control s price s 
indirectly vi a th e "a l lowe d rat e o f re turn " appl ie d t o th e capita l bas e o f th e compan y 
(see sectio n 5.3. 1 fo r thi s method) . Long-distanc e rate s ar e determine d i n conjunct io n 
with thi s al lowe d rate . Be in g a  cos t base d regulator y me thod , R O R regulat ion provide d a 
downward tren d i n AT&T ' s rate s du e t o fallin g acces s ( interconnect ion ) charge s pai d t o 
local exchang e s y s t e m . 5 1 
In Marc h 1989 , th e FC C began t o us e pric e ca p regulat io n wher e long-distanc e rate s ar e 
set directl y b y th e regulato r base d o n a n incentiv e mechan ism , expla ine d i n sect io n 
5.3.2. Th e pric e ca p formul a fo r A T & T al low s th e compan y t o chang e it s price s withi n a 
5 percen t ±  ban d annual l y adjuste d fo r in f la t ion. 5 2 T h e formul a als o require s th e 
company t o reduc e it s rate s b y th e predetermine d productivi t y ( increase ) facto r o f 2. 5 
percent an d a  "consume r d iv idend " of 0. 5 percent . 5 3 
This overv ie w ha s som e importan t implicat ion s fo r U.S . te lecommunicat ion s market . 
First, a l thoug h ther e i s a n asymmetr i c regulator y polic y towar d A T & T , underlyin g 
regulatory concern s abou t it s dominan t rol e i n th e marke t urge s regulator s t o b e 
caut ioned. Second , gradua l deregulat io n cause d mai n compet i tor s o f A T & T t o gai n 
increasing marke t shares . Viscus i e t a l . argue s tha t eve n a  ful l deregulat io n o f th e U.S . 
market i s unlikel y t o en d u p wit h A T & T gainin g dominanc e i n th e marke t . 5 4 Thei r 
analysis i s base d o n th e tw o likel y scenar io s that ar e o f concern . Th e firs t on e predict s 
an unregulate d A T & T substantial l y raise s it s rate s an d th e secon d scenari o see s a n 
unregulated A T & T pursuin g a  predator y polic y o f pricin g ver y lo w t o forc e it s 
compet i tors ou t o f th e market , an d onc e gone , raisin g it s rates . 
T h e firs t scenari o seem s to b e unlikel y give n th e eas e o f customer s switchin g t o anothe r 
provider prove d b y th e approximatel y 3 7 percen t marke t shar e o f th e remainin g servic e 
providers i n 1 9 9 6 . 5 5 Th e us e o f f ibe r opt ic s i n recen t year s provide d a  considerabl e 
4 9 Th e FC C (1999 ) als o reports th e HH I fo r th e tota l tol l market , whic h include s toll revenue s for bot h long-distanc e 
carriers an d loca l exchange companies, has fallen fro m 4,734 t o 2,04 8 ove r th e sam e period o f time . 
5 0 FC C (1999) , p.4 . 
5 1 Viscus i e t al . , ibid., p . 494 . 
5 2 Bridge r M . Mitchel l an d Ing o Vogelsan g (1991), Telecommunications  Pricing:  Theory  and  Practice,  Cambridg e University 
Press, p.16 . 
5 3 Viscus i e t al.,ibid. , p. 494 . 
5 4 Ibid. , p . 495 . 
5 5 Thi s shar e i s 56 .5 % in internationa l long-distanc e marke t i n 199 7 (se e Table-15). 
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excess capaci t y fo r te lecommunicat ion s companie s s o tha t othe r companie s ca n easi l y 
bear th e potentia l switchin g loa d fro m AT&T . 
T h e secon d scenari o i s als o unlikel y suc h tha t th e majo r compet i tors , MC I an d Sprin t ar e 
f inancial ly stron g companie s an d i t woul d tak e a  lon g pric e wa r t o chas e them ou t o f th e 
market. Anothe r facto r i n suppor t o f discount in g thi s scenar i o i s tha t th e mos t o f th e 
cost o f servic e o f MC I an d Sprin t i s du e t o sun k networ k cost s leavin g a  relativel y lo w 
marginal cos t fo r them . I n s u m , they ca n bea r a  possibl e pric e war . 
In conc lus ion , the brea k u p o f A T & T an d th e introductio n o f gradua l compet i t io n i n long -
distance market s i n th e U.S . hav e resulte d i n increasin g pric e an d non-pr ic e compet i t io n 
(see Tab le-1 7 fo r long-distanc e rate s o f thre e majo r carriers) . 
Table 17 : Basi c Schedul e Rate s o f A T & T , MC I an d Sprin t fo r Residentia l 
Customers (1 0 min . Da y Cal l , a s o f Decembe r 3 1 ) 5 6 
5 Mil e Call 9 0 Mil e Cal l 67 8 Mil e Cal l 
AT&T MCI Sprint AT&T MCI Sprint AT&T MCI Sprint 
1980 1.01 3.15 2.37 2.30 3.77 3.22 2.90 
1981 1.13 0.67 3.07 2.67 4.39 3.66 3.36 
1982 1.76 1.53 1.53 0.90 3.28 3.27 4.49 3.74 3.74 
1983 1.76 1.54 1.54 0.90 3.28 3.29 4.49 3.74 3.74 
1984 1.65 1.48 1.62 0.69 3.33 3.49 4.18 3.84 3.98 
1985 1.98 1.80 1.70 3.48 3.29 3.34 3.97 3.84 3.70 
1986 1.75 1.67 1.61 2.95 2.85 2.84 3.44 3.35 3.34 
1987 1.48 1.45 1.46 2.38 2.32 2.34 2.95 2.90 2.92 
1988 1.47 1.44 1.44 2.16 2.12 2.13 2.64 2.69 2.71 
1989 1.71 1.70 1.70 2.21 2.15 2.20 2.40 2.35 2.35 
1990 1.71 1.70 1.71 2.15 2.10 2.10 2.39 2.30 2.30 
1991 1.70 1.70 1.71 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.30 2.30 2.30 
1992 2.00 1.99 2.00 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.30 2.30 2.30 
1993 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.40 2.40 2.40 
1994 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.70 
1995 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.70 
1996 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.80 2.80 2.80 3.00 2.90 3.00 
1997 2.80 2.60 2.60 2.80 2.60 2.80 2.80 2.90 3.00 
1998 2.80 2.60 2.50 2.80 2.60 2.50 2.80 2.90 2.50 
Percent Change 1988 to 199 8 
90% 80% 73% 30% 23% 17% 6% 8% - 8 % 
Source: Referenc e Boo k o f Rates , Pric e Indice s an d Expenditure s fo r Telephon e Service , Industr y Analysi s Division , 
Common Carrie r Bureau , FC C June 1999 . 
Note: Chang e in CP I during 1988-199 8 perio d i s 3 6 % . 
5.4.2.2. Loca l Exchang e Service s Marke t 
Local exchang e serv ices , which complet e th e del iver y o f a n en d serv ice , hav e lon g bee n 
v iewed a s havin g natura l monopol y characterist ics . Bot h th e connect io n o f a n en d use r 
5 6 Basi c schedul e rates ar e those charge d to consumer s who d o no t mak e arrangement s t o b e include d i n a  particula r 
calling plan . 
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to th e syste m b y a  wir e an d subsequen t switchin g service s hav e bee n handle d b y a 
single loca l exchang e operato r du e t o larg e economie s o f scale . Becaus e of a  necessar y 
dupl icat ion o f investmen t fo r wir e connect io n t o eac h sit e an d th e economica l necessit y 
of larg e numbe r o f switche s t o b e handle d b y a  singl e exchang e syste m wa s a lmos t 
prohibit ive fo r compet i t ion . 
The developmen t o f wireles s opt ion s suc h a s th e (analo g an d digital ) cel lula r 
technology, digita l cordles s te lephony , proprietar y (no n cellular ) wireles s loca l loo p an d 
mobi le satellit e s y s t e m s 5 7 hav e practicall y ende d th e monopol y characterist ic s o f wire -
based technolog y fo r servic e connect ion . Now , a  subscr ibe r ca n b e adde d t o th e syste m 
through radi o wave s wi thou t layin g wir e t o th e en d user' s site . T h u s , establ ishin g a 
compet i t ive marke t i n th e t ransmissio n par t o f th e servic e ha s becom e feasible . No t onl y 
for technologica l feasibil it y bu t als o fo r cos t ef fect ivenes s wireles s opt io n become s mor e 
preferable. I n th e area s o f lo w subscr ibe r densi t y ( fewe r tha n 25 0 t o 30 0 subscr iber s pe r 
square ki lometer) , wireles s system s hav e lowe r c o s t s . 5 8 Addit ional ly , th e developmen t o f 
digital switchin g technolog y currentl y al low s fo r eac h carr ie r t o hav e it s ow n switchin g 
facility. A l thoug h thes e t rend s ar e overwhelmingl y pro-compet i t ive , a  quest io n stil l 
remains: Ca n cellula r te lephone s effectivel y replac e wire-base d te lephones ? Current ly , 
cel lular system s nee d wire-base d loca l exchang e system s t o complet e th e del iver y o f 
their servic e (i .e. , t o complet e a  call) . I n fact , 9 8 percen t o f th e cel lula r call s ar e 
completed throug h loca l e x c h a n g e . 5 9 Current ly , loca l te lephon e companie s ar e facin g 
compet i t ion fro m cellula r servic e providers , cabl e T V companie s an d long-distanc e 
companies. Thus , a  full y compet i t iv e solutio n t o loca l exchang e market s remain s t o b e 
seen pendin g furthe r technologica l advances . 
A majo r potentia l obstacl e befor e a  compet i t iv e marke t i n loca l loo p i s the establ ishmen t 
and enforcemen t o f fai r rule s i n interconnect io n (o r access ) issues . A n incumben t loca l 
exchange operato r ma y se t var iou s barrier s t o entr y b y wa y o f pr ic ing , discr iminator y (o r 
preferential) access , technica l obstacle s an d ( interconnect ion ) delays . Eve n a t thi s stag e 
of th e marke t deve lopment , interconnect io n issue s ar e stil l th e mos t chal lengin g aspec t 
of te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n i n th e U. S market . 
In th e U.S , regulat io n o f loca l exchang e an d intraLAT A service s ar e regulate d b y stat e 
PUCs . U p unti l earl y 1990s , thes e service s general l y wer e unde r R O R regu la t ion. 6 0 
Beginning i n mi d 1990s , the genera l t ren d i s a  mov e toward s a  for m o f regulat io n wher e 
price cap s o r hybri d o f th e tw o i s appl ied . Th e F C C , on th e othe r hand , ha s bee n 
auct ioning of f th e spectru m fo r PC S since 1 9 9 4 . 6 1 
5 7 Description s ar e base d on Pete r Smith (1995) , "En d of th e Lin e for th e Loca l Loo p Monopoly?, " Public Policy  for  the 
Private Sector,  Not e No . 63 , The Worl d Bank . 
5 8 Ibid . 
5 9 Viscus i et al . , ibid., p . 500 . 
6 0 Mitchel l an d Vogelsang , ibid., p . 17 . 
6 1 Viscus i et al . , ibid., p . 499 . 
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5.5. Lesson s fo r th e Turkis h Te lecommunicat io n Market : A n Assessmen t 
5.5.1 Regulator y Polic y 
U.S. regulator y exper ienc e i n te lecommunicat ion s present s itsel f a s a  valuabl e lesso n 
and a  sourc e o f posit iv e external i t y fo r Turkey ' s restructurin g efforts . Start in g fro m earl y 
1900s, th e U.S . te lecommunicat ions industr y ha s evolved fro m regulate d monopol y (wit h 
var ious form s o f regulat ion ) t o almos t totall y compet i t iv e industr y structur e wit h 
min imum regulat ion . Compare d t o mos t Europea n an d developin g wor l d 
te lecommunicat ions market s wher e onl y unregulated  government  monopolies  rule , U.S . 
markets hav e indisputabl y bee n i n th e forefront s o f th e industry . Fo r tha t reaso n only , 
policy maker s intereste d i n reformin g thei r te lecommunicat ion s market s ar e obl ige d t o 
listen t o wha t th e U.S . marke t hav e t o sa y regardin g thei r exper ience . 
The mos t vita l point s o f publi c utilit y regulat io n ar e int imatel y relate d t o th e detai l s o f 
the regulator y metho d tha t i s t o b e implemented . A  regulator y syste m canno t rel y onl y 
in vagu e polic y statement s suc h a s eff ic iency , consume r benefi t s etc . A  syste m o f 
specif ic rule s an d method s mus t b e establ ishe d fo r a n effectiv e implementat ion . A 
regulatory syste m mus t b e ope n abou t it s method s o f operat ion . Th i s ha s bee n th e cas e 
in regulate d U.S . publi c utilitie s market s fo r th e pas t century . Wit h th e hel p o f academi a 
and industry , regulator y rule s an d method s hav e evolve d a s th e cos t an d benefit s o f 
these method s wen t unde r publi c scrutiny . Ther e wer e n o hidde n o r secre t formula s bu t 
rather publicl y ope n debate s o n th e effect ivenes s o f thes e methods . Wi t h tha t i n min d 
let u s mak e som e f inding s regardin g th e righ t wa y o f regulatin g th e Turk is h 
te lecommunicat ions industr y i n th e twent y firs t century . 
Up unti l 198 9 whe n th e FC C bega n t o implemen t pric e ca p regulatio n fo r A T & T , th e 
dominant mod e o f te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n i n th e U.S . wa s tha t o f rate-of-retur n 
(ROR) regulat ion . Al l loca l an d long-distanc e te lecommunicat ion s carr ier s wer e subjec t 
to heav y publi c oversigh t wit h detai le d cos t account in g procedures , length y rat e case s 
and prolonge d lit igations . Unde r R O R regulat ion , th e regulate d fir m ha d t o receiv e 
regulatory approva l fo r a lmos t ever y mov e i t ma y mak e includin g som e operat iona l 
aspects o f th e servic e i t provided . Th i s approva l proces s cause d substantia l " regulator y 
lags" resultin g i n ineff iciencie s i n polic y implementat io n an d inabilit y o f f i rm s t o ac t 
instantaneously t o exogenou s demand o r cos t change s i n th e economy . 
However , R O R regulat io n als o brough t abou t som e majo r benefits . Th e mos t notable s 
are creatin g stabl e investmen t envi ronmen t throug h it s revenu e requirement s rul e an d 
lower price s (o r pric e increases) . A s note d i n sectio n 5 .3 .1 , R O R method, bein g a  cos t 
plus metho d o f regulat ion , al low s recover y o f an y " reasonab le " cos t incurre d b y a 
regulated f i rm . Throug h a  for m o f somewha t "gua ran teed " rat e o f return , thi s metho d 
created a  fertil e groun d fo r raisin g sufficien t fund s fo r investment . I n fact , durin g th e 
tenure o f thi s metho d mos t o f th e publi c utilitie s expande d thei r capita l bas e eve n i n 
some case s mor e tha n necessary . Addit ional ly , throug h stric t cos t contro l procedures , 
price increase s of service s subjec t t o publi c regulat io n wer e kep t lowe r relativ e t o othe r 
sectors (se e Tab le-18) . 
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Table -18 CP I vs . Pric e Change s i n Te lephon e Service s 
(% chang e fro m Decembe r o f th e previou s yea r throug h Decembe r o f th e yea r shown ) 
Telephone Service s Loca l Services Interstat e Tol l Servic e Intrastat e Tol l 
Service 
All Good s Inflatio n Inflatio n Inflatio n Inflatio n 
Period an d Service s Adjuste d Adjuste d Adjuste d Adjuste d 
1980 12.5 4.6 -7.1 7 -4.9 3.4 -8.1 -0.6 -11.6 
1981 8.9 11.7 2.5 12.6 3.3 14.6 5.2 6.2 -2.5 
1982 3.8 7.2 3.3 10.8 6.7 2.6 -1.2 4.2 0.3 
1983 3.8 3.6 -0.2 3.1 -0.6 1.5 -2.2 7.4 3.4 
1984 3.9 9.2 5.1 17.2 12.7 -4.3 -8 3.6 -0.3 
1985 3.8 4.7 0.8 8.9 5 -3.7 -7.2 0.6 -3.1 
1986 1.1 2.7 1.6 7.1 5.9 -9.4 -10.4 0.3 -0.8 
1987 4.4 -1.3 -5.5 3.3 -1 -12.4 -16.1 -3 -7.1 
1988 4.4 1.3 -3 4.5 0.1 -4.2 -8.2 -4.2 -8.3 
1989 4.6 -0.3 -4.7 0.6 -3.9 -1.3 -5.7 -2.6 -6.9 
1990 6.1 -0.4 -6.2 1 -4.8 -3.7 -9.3 -2.2 -7.8 
1991 3.1 3.5 0.4 5.1 2 1.3 -1.7 -1.5 -4.4 
1992 2.9 -0.3 -3.1 0.5 -2.4 -1.3 -4.1 -2.4 -5.1 
1993 2.7 1.8 -0.9 1 -1.7 6.5 3.7 0.2 -2.5 
1994 2.7 0.7 -2 -0.3 -2.9 5.4 2.7 -1 -3.6 
1995 2.5 1.2 -1.3 2.6 0 0.1 -2.3 -3.8 -6.2 
1996 3.3 2.1 -1.2 0.9 -2.4 3.7 0.4 6.1 2.7 
1997 1.7 0.2 -1.4 1 -0.6 -4.3 -5.9 2.8 1.1 
1998 1.6 0.3 -1.9 1.3 -0.3 -0.8 -2.4 1.5 -0.1 
Source: FC C (Jun e 1999) . 
Meanwhi le , th e cos t sid e o f thi s analysi s als o attracte d widesprea d attent ion . B y passin g 
through mos t cost s i t incurre d th e regulate d fir m unde r R O R regulat io n di d no t hav e 
much incentiv e t o cu t cost s o r becom e mor e efficient . T h e lac k o f a  built-i n "eff ic ienc y 
incent ive" mechanis m i n thi s metho d le d bot h regulator s an d th e academic s t o 
investigate othe r methods , whic h favo r mor e efficien t outcomes . Pr ic e caps , a s 
performance base d regulator y pricin g mechan isms , hav e prove d t o b e th e mos t 
prominent metho d i n te lecommunicat ion s sec to r . 6 2 Pr ic e ca p method , b y usin g a 
fo rmula , provide s a n incentiv e fo r th e regulate d fir m t o b e mor e efficien t an d al low s th e 
f irm t o kee p a  potentia l productivi t y gai n fo r a  predefine d perio d o f t ime . Benef i t s als o 
accrue t o consumer s sinc e a ) pric e increase s ar e cappe d a t th e inflatio n leve l ( les s a 
productivi ty offset ) an d b ) regulato r ma y lowe r th e pric e ca p a t th e en d o f th e revie w 
period consider in g eff icienc y improvement s o f th e f i r m . 6 3 
6 2 Pric e caps are also widely use d in othe r networ k industrie s suc h as electric powe r an d natura l ga s sectors with notabl e 
success. 
6 3 A  U.S . FCC performanc e revie w indicate s that pric e caps yielded $1. 8 billio n o f gain s to consumer s over the 1990-9 3 
period an d a  study b y R . Schmalensee and J. H. Rohlf s shows that 9 0 percen t o f th e gain s from pric e cap regulatio n wen t 
to consumer s and the remainin g t o AT& T stockholders (R . Schmalensee and J . H. Rohlf s (1992) , "Productivit y Gain s 
Resulting fro m Interstat e Pric e Cap s fo r AT&T, " filed fo r FCC , Docke t 92-134 , cited i n Jeffrey H . Rohlf s (1996) , 
"Regulating Telecommunications," Public Policy  for  the  Private  Sector,  Th e World Bank . 
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Price cap s hav e othe r eff icienc y improvemen t implicat ion s t o o . 6 4 The y d iscourag e f i rm s 
from cross-subsidiz in g thei r compet i t iv e services . Cross-subsid izat io n i s anothe r su b 
opt imal ou tcom e o f R O R method wher e regulate d entit y ca n shif t cos t o f it s compet i t iv e 
services t o regulate d service s an d creat e unfai r compet i t io n i n compet i t iv e markets . 
Under pric e cap s method , thi s strateg y doe s no t pa y of f sinc e th e fir m ha s n o 
opportuni ty t o recou p thos e los t profits . Th e onl y cross-subsid y which ma y tak e plac e 
(and usuall y impose d o n th e f irm ) i s throug h th e provisio n o f "universa l serv ice " wher e 
high cos t (rural ) customer s ar e subsidize d a t th e expens e o f others . Finally , pric e cap s 
provide flexibil it y fo r th e fir m t o adjus t it s rate s withi n th e boundar y o f th e ca p formul a 
without causin g majo r regulator y lags , as they wer e th e cas e i n R O R regu la t ion. 6 5 
Beside abov e sai d benef i ts , a  regulato r i s face d wit h a  strategi c decis ion-makin g 
regarding th e durat io n o f revie w period s fo r pric e caps . Whi l e longe r revie w period s ar e 
designed t o creat e opportuni t y fo r a  fir m t o lea p productivi t y gain s a n inappropriatel y 
longer revie w perio d ma y b e fa r f ro m reflectin g recen t pr ice , cos t an d deman d 
condit ions. O n th e othe r hand , shortenin g th e ter m o f th e pla n wil l induc e inefficien t 
behavior o r el iminat e eff icienc y incentive s o f thi s m e t h o d . 6 6 Thi s apparen t t rad e of f i s 
extremely importan t i n a  highl y volati l e inflationar y env i ronmen t lik e Turke y sinc e 
frequent ca p adjustment s wil l en d u p reducin g gain s o f th e fir m fro m productivit y 
increases thu s el iminatin g originall y intende d incentives . 
Final ly, a l thoug h pric e cap s ar e efficien t wa y o f control l in g price s the y provid e littl e hel p 
when i t come s t o non-pr ic e aspect s o f servic e provision . T h e fir m ca n substi tut e lowe r 
prices i n retur n fo r lowe r quali t y an d th e regulato r need s t o develo p "qual i t y o f serv ice " 
indices an d performanc e reviews . Suc h qual i t y indice s ar e i n plac e i n th e U.S . an d 
regulators impos e monetar y penalt ie s i n cas e o f performin g belo w certai n benchmark . 6 7 
However , beyon d suc h mechanica l aspect s o f regulat io n a  "cul tur e o f regulat ion " need s 
to b e establ ished . Th i s cultur e i s dramatical l y differen t tha n a  pricin g syste m wher e 
unregulated governmen t monopol ie s impos e arbitrar y pricin g scheme s upo n th e 
consumer. Regulat io n require s a  t ransparen t cos t account in g wit h al l procedure s bein g 
made publi c an d debate d i n a  publi c proceeding . I n suc h a n institutiona l env i ronment , 
whi le a n economical l y an d polit icall y independen t regulato r make s decis ions , consumers' 
voice i s hear d befor e th e en d result . Th e decis ion-makin g i s execute d i n suc h a n 
envi ronment tha t al l s takeholder s ar e al lowe d t o interven e a t thei r wil l an d b e a  par t o f 
the fina l rul ing . T h u s , thi s "cu l tu re " render s itsel f a s a  democrat i c one . Publ i c utilit y 
pricing mus t no t b e see n a s a  mean s o f taxat io n an d it s account in g shoul d b e 
completely independen t o f othe r (public ) budgetar y concerns . It s pricin g ca n no t b e 
al lowed t o b e determine d i n a  su b opt ima l manne r whic h wil l creat e addit iona l 
distort ions i n othe r sector s o f th e economy . 
A polic y o f pr ivat izat ion , i n th e absenc e of a  wel l though t regulator y f ramework , woul d 
likely t o en d u p i n a  chaot i c marke t s i tuat ion , a t leas t f ro m consumers ' perspect ives. A t 
6 4 Rohlfs , ibid. 
6 5 Currently , telecom companies subject t o pric e cap regulatio n (eithe r a t th e federa l o r loca l level ) ar e require d t o fil e 
their tariff s wit h regulato r bu t ar e no t require d t o receiv e regulatory approva l a s long a s provision s o f th e pric e ca p 
formula ar e maintained . 
6 6 Rohlfs , ibid. and Train, ibid . 
6 7 Benchmark s such as answering director y assistanc e or operato r call s under certai n tim e limit . 
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present t ime , delaye d sal e o f Tur k Te leko m ca n b e considere d a s a n opportuni t y fo r 
establ ishment o f suc h a  regulator y structur e i n advanc e o f privatizatio n t o minimiz e th e 
risk o f a  chaot i c transit ion . 
Meanwhi le , implement in g regulat io n i n a  leas t compl icate d an d a  mor e streamline d 
fashion wil l enhanc e it s eff iciency . I n fact , a s th e curren t pac e o f fas t technologica l 
deve lopments i n th e industr y ope n mor e roo m fo r compet i t io n th e te lecommunicat ion s 
regulat ion i s see n a s a  short- ter m transitor y proces s which mus t b e a t min imu m possibl e 
scale. Wi t h al l thi s i n m ind , th e basi c premis e o f publi c regulat io n i s to protec t consume r 
interests. Whi l e pric e cap s provid e eff icienc y incent ives , th e regulato r mus t kee p a 
watchful ey e t o increas e consumer surplus . 
T h u s , eve n wit h a  subsequen t publi c regulat io n th e fina l gam e woul d b e fa r f ro m over . 
The fina l targe t i s t o provid e service s i n a  full y compet i t iv e manner . Publ i c regulat io n i s 
just a n intermediat e ste p i n establ ishin g compet i t iv e markets . A s th e U.S . exper ienc e 
shows u s clearly , thi s i s easie r sai d tha n done . Compet i t io n i n thos e market s i s general l y 
achieved i n a  gradua l manner , on e ste p a t a  t ime . 
5.5.2 Regulator y Institution s 
In th e las t decad e o r so , ther e ha s bee n a  signif ican t t ren d towar d convergenc e amon g 
network industries . Whi l e th e structur e o f deman d i n th e te lecommunicat ion s secto r 
changes fro m a  deman d fo r f ixe d voic e te lephon y servic e t o a  deman d fo r mult iproduc t 
services (suc h a s cellula r a s wel l a s f ixe d te lephony , an d interne t serv ices) , a 
convergence i s observe d withi n th e te lecommunicat ion s an d amon g differen t sector s o f 
the networ k industries . O n th e on e hand , mobi l e te lephon e service s ar e increasingl y 
becoming a  substi tut e fo r f ixe d te lephon y service s an d loca l an d long-distanc e call in g 
services ar e bein g offere d i n a  bundle d fashion . O n th e othe r hand , ther e i s a  visibl e 
trend towar d mult ioperato r servic e provisio n suc h tha t te lephon e serv ices , broadcast ing , 
cable televisio n an d th e Interne t operator s becom e on e singl e provider . Thus , th e 
te lecommunicat ions servic e i s fo rming , a s a  composi t e produc t wit h changin g 
characterist ics an d th e rol e o f th e regulato r need s t o b e redefine d i n th e ligh t o f 
procompet i t ive deve lopment s i n th e market . I n fact , now , on e ca n tal k abou t 
"convergence o f regulat ion. " 
Mult isector publi c utilit y commiss ion s hav e bee n th e nor m sinc e thei r inceptio n i n th e 
U.S. Regulat io n o f thes e utilitie s unde r on e roo f wa s no t onl y a  matte r o f choic e bu t 
also a s a  resul t o f eff icienc y concerns . I n fact , regulatin g thes e networ k industrie s whic h 
have simila r characterist ic s prove d t o b e resourc e savin g an d mor e prohibit iv e i n term s 
of " regulator y capture . " N o w , i t seem s tha t thi s approac h t o utilit y regulat io n i s 
promising t o b e eve n mor e funct iona l g ive n thos e ne w trend s i n th e industry . 
Smith (1997 ) argue s th e reason s fo r regulator y convergenc e i n a  mor e systemat i c 
w a y : 6 8 T h e firs t reaso n i s th e obv iou s on e whic h i s relate d t o th e increasin g over la p 
6 8 Pete r Smith (1997) , "Wha t th e Transformatio n o f Telecom Market s Mean s for Regulatio n " Public Policy  for  the  Private 
Sector, Not e No : 121 , The Worl d Bank . 
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between regulat io n o f carr iag e ( te lecommunicat ions ) an d regulat io n o f conten t 
(broadcast ing) a s th e mult iproduc t utilit y operator s provid e service s i n a  bundle d 
fashion. Th e secon d i s somewha t relate d t o th e firs t one : th e substitutabil i t y o f service s 
across subsector s o r marke t segment s create s pressure s fo r harmonizin g regulat io n 
across communicat ion s subsectors . 
However , th e remainin g tw o reason s ar e les s apparent . Th e mos t fundamenta l issu e i n 
the ne w er a o f te lecommunicat ion s regulat io n i s t o creat e compet i t io n i n thes e markets . 
A l though ther e ar e issue s specif i c t o te lecommunicat ion s secto r o r networ k industrie s i n 
genera l , th e polic y itsel f i s basicall y compet i t io n policy . I n thi s context , th e pressur e fo r 
regulatory convergenc e i s originatin g no t onl y f ro m changin g technolog y an d marke t 
structures, bu t als o fro m increasin g rol e o f internationa l agreement s o n 
te lecommunicat ions regulat ion . Onc e th e internationall y impose d rule s o f compet i t io n 
are i n effect , th e regulator y rule s regardin g networ k industrie s nee d t o b e implemente d 
in a  coordinate d way . Last ly , i n conjunct io n wit h thi s las t point , recentl y accorde d W T O 
agreements ar e likel y t o en d compartmental izat io n o f regulator y policie s bot h a t th e 
national an d internationa l leve l an d wil l provid e internationa l harmonizat io n o f 
regulat ion. Europea n compet i t ion polic y i s one ste p i n thi s d i rec t ion . 6 9 
These deve lopment s urg e Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s regulator s t o b e conf irmin g t o 
recent t rend s i n th e publi c utilit y sector s wor ldwide . Th e opt ima l mode l i n publi c utilit y 
regulat ion, especial l y at thi s juncture , i s a  mult isecto r regulator y agenc y whic h funct ion s 
in clos e coordinat io n wit h al l publi c utilit y sector s an d implement s it s regulator y rule s 
and method s wit h thi s t ransformin g secto r i n mind . Regulator y captur e i s als o les s 
probable wit h mult isecto r agencie s sinc e mor e cros s scrutin y wil l b e feasibl e b y th e al l 
part icipants i n th e industry . A s i s th e cas e i n curren t Turk is h legislativ e init iative , 
establ ishment o f separat e regulator y agencie s for eac h respectiv e utilit y secto r wil l prov e 
to b e les s tha n opt ima l i n term s o f eff icienc y an d t ransparenc y an d internationa l 
harmon iza t ion . 7 0 
5.6 Fina l Thought s o n Regulat io n 
Recent wav e o f restructurin g o f networ k industrie s i n th e Wester n Hemispher e an d 
much o f th e emergin g market s usuall y too k a n integrate d approac h an d combine d 
privatization wit h restructuring . Restructur in g o f a  te lecommunicat ion s industr y require s 
separat ing loca l exchang e fro m it s long-distanc e componen t whi l e maintainin g loca l 
exchange unde r regulate d monopol y structure . Long-distanc e service s ca n easi l y b e 
provided i n a  compet i t iv e manne r wit h min imu m regulator y oversight . T h e basi c targe t 
in restructurin g i s t o provid e th e en d servic e a s competi t ivel y a s possible . Restructur in g 
6 9 Smit h (ibid., ) als o underline s on e majo r predictio n tha t a s a resul t o f transformatio n i n telecommunications marke t an d 
telecommunications regulator y agencie s will eventuall y disappear , absorbed into multisecto r antitrus t agencies. 
7 0 However , establishing such a regulator y agenc y alone i s in n o wa y sufficien t fo r a  successfu l regulation. I n countrie s 
with wea k governanc e and governmen t interventio n a  regulator y syste m will likel y to resul t i n failure . Pete r Smith an d 
Bjorn Wellenius (1999)," Mitigatin g Regulator y Ris k i n Telecommunications," Public Policy  for  the  Private  Sector,  Th e 
World Ban k cites such an example . In Philippine s where suc h a multisecto r regulato r existed , Philippines Long Distance 
Telephone Company' s (PLDT) friendly tie s with the governmen t i n 1978-8 3 allowed the compan y to rais e prices , borro w 
heavily, limi t investmen t i n loca l facilities , take ove r othe r companies , and channe l hig h profit s t o th e account s o f 
controlling shareholders . Coupled with regulator y failures , the resul t wer e exclusiv e rights fo r a  service provided no t a t al l 
in som e areas and inadequatel y i n mos t others . 
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prepares th e industr y t o a  potential l y full y compet i t iv e market . Ther e ar e n o technica l , 
economic o r otherwis e reason s no t t o provid e long-distanc e service s competi t ively . 
Thus , restructurin g include s creatin g a  lega l bas e fo r establ ishmen t o f long-distanc e 
carriers. Thei r acces s t o loca l exchang e mus t b e subjec t t o fai r rule s o f regulat io n s o 
that n o discr iminator y practice s can take place . 
Until th e secto r i s mature d sufficiently , long-distanc e rate s ca n b e subjecte d t o pric e 
caps. W h e n th e marke t share s of var iou s f irm s reac h certai n level s suc h that a  threa t o f 
dominant fir m o r predator y pricin g i s unlikely , pric e regulat io n ca n b e removed , leavin g 
the regulato r funct ionin g largel y fo r consume r protect ion . 
The succes s o f regulat io n i s heavi l y depende d o n establ ishin g a  competen t regulator y 
body. Hence , regulator y institutio n mus t b e staffe d wit h qualif ie d at torneys , economist s 
and engineers . Top- leve l administrator s mus t hav e substantia l knowledg e an d 
exper ience relate d t o th e industr y wit h n o organi c link s t o th e regulate d entit ies . The y 
will b e responsibl e fo r polic y decis ion s and mus t b e accountabl e t o th e fulles t extent . 
There shoul d a lway s b e a n appea l proces s open t o regulate d f irm s i n cas e o f potentia l 
gr ievances fol lowin g th e ruling s o f th e regulator , a s thi s woul d b e consisten t fo r a 
democrat ic " regulator y cu l ture. " 
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6. Concludin g Remark s 
In thi s pape r w e presente d th e cas e fo r te lecommunicat ion s privatizatio n an d 
summar ized th e globa l t rend s bot h i n globa l te lecommunicat ion s industr y an d 
privatization. Th e ev idenc e presente d i n thi s pape r suggest s tha t te lecommunicat ion s 
industry i s clearl y shiftin g t o a  compet i t iv e marke t structure , albei t a t vary in g pac e an d 
degree i n bot h develope d an d emergin g markets . Change s i n ownershi p i n particularl y 
incumbent operator s ar e a n importan t componen t o f thi s shift . Th e intertwine d natur e 
of thes e tw o paralle l change s i s paramoun t i n evolut io n o f a n efficien t an d compet i t iv e 
industry. There fore , invariably , privatizatio n effort s ar e couple d wit h emergenc e o f a 
new marke t conf igurat io n an d importan t ne w regulator y ar rangements . Eve n i f w e 
presume tha t privatizin g government s hav e al read y buil t a  soun d privatizatio n 
infrastructure an d politica l consensu s t o handl e larg e privat izat ions , te lecommunicat ion s 
privatizations prov e t o b e sophist icate d t ransact ions . However , a  matur e privatizatio n 
infrastructure an d particularl y politica l consensu s hardl y descr ib e th e privatizatio n 
context fo r man y emerg in g economie s includin g Turkey . Fro m thi s vantag e point , w e 
identify severa l proble m area s i n th e Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s refor m an d particularl y 
in th e Tur k Te leko m privat izat ion , whic h resulte d i n severa l faile d at tempt s wit h 
substantial opportuni t y cost s to th e Turk is h economy . 
First, Turke y faile d t o establ is h a  soun d lega l infrastructur e tha t woul d provid e th e 
flexibil ity fo r alternativ e privatizatio n strategie s particularl y unde r varyin g ownershi p 
conf igurat ions. Th e straigh t lega l jacke t derai le d th e privatizatio n effort s mor e tha n 
once , an d cont inue s t o b e th e mos t importan t impedimen t t o privatizatio n unde r curren t 
market condit ions . Therefor e a  robus t lega l f ramewor k consisten t wit h th e envis ione d 
evolut ion o f th e te lecommunicat io n secto r i s neede d t o legaliz e Tur k Te leko m 
privatization an d t o l iberat e th e proces s fro m debil i tatin g constraints . A l thoug h 
resolution o f thi s issu e goe s fa r beyon d technica l requirement s o f pr ivat izat ion , an d 
chal lenges archai c approache s t o private-publ i c ownershi p d ichotom y ingraine d i n th e 
restrictive consti tut io n o f Turkey , i t ha s t o b e addresse d hea d o n fo r an y prospec t o f a 
successful privatizatio n o f Tur k Te leko m an d restructurin g i n te lecommunicat ion s 
industry. A l thoug h th e amende d te leco m la w i s a  ver y posit iv e ste p i n thi s d i rect ion , 
consti tut ional l imitatio n remain s t o b e addressed . 
The secon d importan t issu e i s the resolutio n o f th e political  opposi t io n t o privatizatio n o f 
Turk Te lekom . Th i s require s a  dramat i c shif t i n th e privatizatio n debate , whic h ha s bee n 
overwhelmingly superficia l an d dominate d b y ei the r distrus t t o privat e enterpr is e wit h n o 
reference t o economi c merit s o r merel y promotin g privat e ownershi p withou t regar d t o 
any subsequen t precaut ionar y measure s t o protec t consumers . An y observe r o f th e 
Turk Te leko m privatizatio n proces s wil l b e astonishe d b y th e " lac k o f subs tance " an d 
extremely polit icize d natur e o f th e argument s ei the r i n favo r o f privatizatio n o r agains t 
it. Th e author s o f thi s pape r fol lowe d th e Turk is h medi a o n a  dai l y basi s i n th e las t 
couple o f year s an d the y ar e ye t t o se e a n economi c argumen t fo r o r agains t th e 
privatization o f Tur k Te lekom . Th i s topic , o n th e othe r hand , surprisingl y ha s receive d 
little attentio n i n th e Turk is h academi a i n spit e o f it s populari t y an d signif icance . O n th e 
other hand , i t i s fai r t o argu e tha t buildin g publi c opinio n i s a  pr imar y responsibi l i t y o f 
the government s contemplat in g large-scal e privatizations . Shift in g th e discussio n to a n 
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economic domai n an d energiz e th e loca l expert s an d academic s toward s a  publicize d 
t ransparent debat e ar e likel y t o hel p i n buildin g a  suppor t bas e fo r te lecommunicat ion s 
privatization an d reduc e th e politica l opposi t ion . 
The thir d importan t issu e i s the scop e o f privatizatio n o f Tur k Te lekom . I t i s unfortunat e 
that th e curren t approac h t o Tur k Te leko m privatizatio n reduce d i t t o a  cas h generat in g 
transact ion fo r th e embatt le d stat e treasury . Whi l e w e se e privatizatio n a s a n 
opportuni ty t o t ransfor m th e industr y t o a n efficien t an d compet i t iv e one , w e d o no t 
think tha t th e curren t desig n i s aggressivel y takin g advantag e o f thi s opportunity . W e 
are concerne d tha t th e extensio n o f monopol y right s t o Tur k Te leko m unti l 200 4 i s likel y 
to creat e impediment s fo r th e evolut io n o f a  compet i t iv e industr y fo r th e reason s 
extensively d iscusse d i n th e paper . Th e amende d la w condit ional l y remove s monopol y 
powers o f Tur k Te lekom , linkin g monopol y righ t t o th e remainin g governmen t 
ownership. I n an y case , compet i t iv e evolut io n o f th e industr y shoul d b e th e pr imar y 
policy target , an d privatizatio n shoul d onl y b e see n a s a n instrumen t i n thi s 
development . 
Fourthly, Tur k Te lekom' s privatizatio n strateg y need s t o includ e a  comprehens iv e 
perspect ive pla n fo r restructurin g th e Turk is h te lecommunicat ion s industr y a s a  whole . 
Because o f te lecommunicat io n industry' s importanc e (a s mos t othe r networ k industrie s 
are) i n overal l economi c activi ty , a n industr y structur e wit h inefficien t operat io n wil l 
create distort ion s e lsewher e an d reduc e compet i t ivenes s o f var iou s sector s ope n t o 
international markets . Th i s perspect iv e pla n shoul d includ e creatin g a  credibl e an d wel l -
def ined regulator y env i ronmen t tha t wil l reduc e uncertainty , whic h i s current l y perceive d 
by foreig n investors . I n a  sense , laggin g proces s of Tur k Te lekom' s sal e can b e take n a s 
an opportuni t y fo r creatin g suc h a  regulator y infrastructur e tha t entai l s detai le d rule s 
and roa d map . Suc h a  strategi c mov e wil l signa l commi tmen t o n government ' s behal f 
and preemp t hesitat ion s o f investors . Sophist icate d foreig n an d domest i c institutiona l 
investors ar e likel y t o b e intereste d i n th e rule s regardin g fo r example , interconnect io n 
charges t o loca l networks , specif i c regulator y method(s ) fo r rat e settin g o r th e appea l 
process fol lowin g a  regulator y rul ing . W h e n suc h a  commi tmen t towar d a n ope n an d 
enforceable regulator y syste m i s signale d prio r t o th e sa le , i t wil l hel p t o reduc e ris k 
premium leadin g t o highe r privatizatio n proceeds . 
Last ly, th e goa l o f restructurin g te lecommunicat ion s industr y shoul d no t b e merel y 
t ransfer o f ownershi p bu t rathe r providin g consumer s low-cos t an d bette r service . On e 
should kee p i n min d tha t restructurin g effort s ar e originate d i n th e U.S . marke t wher e al l 
operators ar e privatel y owned . Thes e effort s ar e i n thei r advanc e stage s an d bein g 
fol lowed b y Europea n market s wher e th e publi c ownershi p i s c o m m o n . Rapi d pac e o f 
change i n th e industr y point s t o wav e o f merger s o f compan ie s operat in g i n differen t 
segments o f th e industry . Th e majo r impetu s behin d th e brea k u p o f A T & T i n 198 2 wa s 
the intentio n o f creat in g compet i t io n i n th e marke t a t larg e b y separat in g long-distanc e 
services fro m it s loca l exchang e component . A t thi s juncture , i n man y develope d 
markets whi l e th e long-distanc e carrier s ar e goin g int o loca l te lephon e servic e business, 
incumbent loca l exchang e operator s ar e gainin g increasin g marke t share s i n long ¬
distance segment . Further , a  convergenc e i n networ k industrie s i s becomin g a  fac t suc h 
that, mos t ( te lephone , cab le , interne t etc. ) service s are increasingl y bein g offere d b y a 
single provider . Technologica l innovat ion s reduc e th e scop e fo r th e scal e economie s i n 
50 
network industr ies , particularl y i n te lecommunicat ions . Th i s (desired ) end-resul t o f 
restructuring i s likel y t o conver t regulator y bodie s int o somewha t antitrus t agencie s i n 
the future . However , unti l t hen , thes e market s mus t b e regulated . 
The curren t marke t condit ion s i n globa l te lecommunicat ion s industr y an d a  ver y 
congested privatizatio n pipelin e sugges t tha t eve n i f th e politica l an d lega l hurdle s ar e 
overcome, privatizatio n o f Tur k Te leko m wil l b e a  chal lenge . Th e depresse d globa l 
te lecom valuat ion s impl y tha t Turk is h Te leko m ca n hardl y attai n valuat ion s at tache d t o i t 
in 199 9 an d earl y 2000 . Th i s wil l furthe r weake n th e privatizatio n prospect s du e it s 
political implicat ions . A l thoug h th e amende d la w create d th e opportuni t y t o reduc e 
governance ris k an d therefor e potential l y enhance d va lu e t o prospect iv e buyers , i t i s 
hardly sufficien t t o mak e u p th e conjectura l discoun t tha t th e compan y faces . Final ly , 
current economi c an d politica l instabilit y i n Turke y d o no t offe r th e mos t attractiv e 
condit ions t o accommodat e a  large-scal e privatization . 
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L= noncapita l inpu t 
r= cos t o f capita l 
w= cos t o f noncapita l inpu t 
In a n unregulate d monopol y case , F.O.C . woul d yiel d as : 
T h e condit io n fo r efficien t al locatio n o f resource s would be : 
( i .e., th e fir m i s al lowed t o ear n a  highe r 
R O R the n th e tru e cos t o f capital ) an d 
T h u s , 
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